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INTRODUCTION
Nevada’s current statute limiting noneconomic damages for medical mal-
practice took effect November 23, 2004.1 More than eight years later, however,
the state’s trial courts continue to confront a significant question about how the
statute should be applied2: In cases of fatal medical malpractice, does the “med
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, William S. Boyd School of Law, Las Vegas. I thank my wife,
Jennifer, and our son, Dylan, for their understanding and support. I also thank my fellow
editors and staff members of Nevada Law Journal, Volume 13, for their patience, assistance,
and diligent work on this Note. Additionally, I must acknowledge that the credit for most of
the arguments presented in this Note goes to the attorneys who first made those arguments,
including Laurence Springberg, Andre Mura, Lindsay Eaton, Peter Wetherall, Dennis
Kennedy, Dan Polsenberg, and Ramzy Ladah.
1 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2011).
2 See Petition for Extraordinary Writ Relief at 9–10, Universal Health Servs. Found. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 62209 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Universal Health Petition] (noting the “inconsistent rulings” on the question among
Nevada trial court judges with three finding for the per-plaintiff application of the cap
(including the action generating the Petition) and two ruling for per-incident application; also
stating that “[t]his issue continues to appear before different District Courts in Nevada”).
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mal cap”3 apply per incident, or does the cap apply per plaintiff? In other
words, may each heir of a person killed by medical malpractice recover up to
the statutory limit of $350,000 in noneconomic damages, or is $350,000 the
maximum noneconomic damages for each group of heirs?
Nevada’s state trial judges disagree on the answer. In 2007, Second Judi-
cial District Judge Steven P. Elliott found the cap applied to the heirs collec-
tively; in effect he ruled that the maximum amount of noneconomic damages
recoverable for each incident of fatal medical malpractice is $350,000 no mat-
ter how many plaintiffs sue over that death.4 In 2010, Eighth Judicial District
Judge Stefany Miley effectively ruled the same as Judge Elliott had on the
question.5 But just two weeks after Judge Miley’s decision, Eighth Judicial
District Judge Mark Denton came to the opposite conclusion, finding that each
heir could recover up to $350,000.6
The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized the dispute as an important
one,7 but has yet to resolve it8 despite having been petitioned to do so twice.9
The justices heard oral arguments en banc on the question in 2011,10 but a
couple of months after those oral arguments, while the court apparently was
3 Statutory limits on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice are commonly called
“med mal caps.” Throughout this Note, I will use this phrase or its singular version.
4 Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment at 6, Sieben v. Lifecare Hosps. of N. Nev.,
Inc., No. CV06-00864 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Apr. 9, 2007), 2007 WL 7266257, at *4 [hereinafter
Sieben Order] (“[P]ursuant to NRS 41A.035, Plaintiffs may recover no more than $350,000
in non-economic damages, collectively.”).
5 Order Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion Confirming the Applicable Damage Cap Required
Under NRS 41A.035 at 2, Villegas v. Sheikh, No. A561497 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Jan. 11, 2010),
2010 WL 3711512, at *1 [hereinafter Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap] (“[T]he applicable
damage cap is for ALL Plaintiffs and ALL Defendants.”).
6 Order at 2, Tremblay v. Blanco-Cuevas, No. A577086 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 2010)
(motion for partial summary judgment regarding single statutory cap on noneconomic dam-
age and joinder thereto by second defendant denied “because each of the plaintiffs has a
separate cause of action under NRS 41.085(2), and NRS 41A.035 uses the term ‘plaintiff’ in
the singular”) [hereinafter Tremblay Order].
7 Order Directing Answer at 1, Villegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark,
No. 55825 (Nev. May 3, 2010) (granting plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus or prohibi-
tion regarding the Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5). The grounds for the
petition request were that the question presented “important, novel, and purely legal issues
necessitating an immediate and definitive determination” by the court. See Petition for Writ
of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Supporting
Exhibits at 7–11, Villegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825
(Nev. Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Villegas Mandamus Petition].
8 Research for this Note ended on March 31, 2013.
9 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 7, petition denied, Order Denying Petition for
Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition at 2, Universal Health Servs. Found. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 62209 (Nev. Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Order Deny-
ing Universal Health Petition]; Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 1, petition
dismissed, Order Dismissing Petition at 1, Villegas v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty.
of Clark, No. 55825 (Nev. May 31, 2011), 2011 WL 2163538, at *1 [hereinafter Order
Dismissing Villegas Petition].
10 Oral Argument, Villegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825
(Nev. argued Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/oralargu-
ments/1013-villegas-vs-dist-ct-sheikh [hereinafter Villegas Oral Argument].
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still trying to sort out how to rule on the matter, the parties settled,11 and the
justices dismissed the petition without deciding the question.12 The lack of a
definitive answer left two more Eighth Judicial District Court judges, Gloria
Sturman and Abbi Silver, to wrestle with the question in 2012.13 In her ruling,
Judge Sturman took the extra step of encouraging the state’s high court to again
take up—and this time resolve—the question because of its “significant contro-
versy.”14 Apparently, however, the justices will not revisit this difficult and
highly politicized question15 until they have no other choice. In February 2013,
the court denied a petition that sought reexamination of the question.16 The
petitioner—the same defendant hospital corporation that had been the respon-
dent in the case that settled after oral argument in 201117—urged the court to
“intervene now to decide an important issue of law which has been incongru-
ously decided in the District Courts, and which will significantly affect the
proceedings in [. . .] many other medical malpractice/wrongful death cases.”18
But a three-justice panel decided that intervention by way of extraordinary
relief was not warranted because the petitioners had “an adequate legal remedy
in the form of an appeal from any adverse final judgment.”19
In light of the split among trial judges,20 Judge Sturman’s formal
11 See Stipulation to Withdraw and Dismiss Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of
Prohibition at 1–3, Villegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825
(Nev. May 6, 2011).
12 Order Dismissing Villegas Petition, supra note 9.
13 Decision and Order at 5, Mehanna v. Universal Health Servs. Found., No. A624512 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Mehanna Order]; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–3, Neal v. Mirza, No. A-10-631671-C (Nev. Dist. Ct.
May 31, 2012) [hereinafter Neal Order].
14 Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3 (“The Court notes that the issues raised in the instant
Motion have provoked significant controversy, and therefore encourages the Nevada
Supreme Court to take this issue up on a writ, if pursued.”).
15 See, e.g., Paul Harasim, Medical Malpractice Reforms Still Divide, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Oct. 26, 2008, at B1 [hereinafter Harasim, Reforms Still Divide] (noting that doctors fought a
bitter campaign against trial lawyers over the medical malpractice statute in 2004); Paul
Harasim & Ed Vogel, Question 3 Challenged Anew, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 21, 2004, at
A1 (noting trial lawyers’ multiple lawsuits aimed at keeping Question 3 off the ballot,
intense lobbying by proponents and opponents of Question 3, Secretary of State accusing
Nevada Supreme Court justices of being biased, placement of a competing measure on the
ballot); see also Joelle Babula, Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Guinn Might Call
Special Session, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 11, 2002 at A1 (reporting battle lines being drawn
between doctors and trial lawyers and the intense arguments between the two sides spurring
the governor to call for a special session of the legislature).
16 Order Denying Universal Health Petition, supra note 9, at 2.
17 Valley Health System, LLC, represented by the same counsel, Dennis Kennedy of Bailey
Kennedy, in both instances. Compare Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 1 (peti-
tioner Valley Health System, LLC) with Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at
16:05–16:09 (attorney Dennis Kennedy introducing himself to the court as representing
respondent, Valley Health System, LLC).
18 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 2.
19 Order Denying Universal Health Petition, supra note 9, at 2.
20 Compare Mehanna Order, supra note 13, at 5 (finding the med mal cap applies to each
plaintiff heir individually), Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that in the wrongful
death context the med mal cap applies “per person, per claim, regardless of the number of
actors”), and Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (denying defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment regarding single statutory cap on noneconomic damages because each of
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encouragement,21 and the petitions for extraordinary relief,22 it appears inevita-
ble that  the Nevada Supreme Court eventually will have to resolve the dispute.
When the court finally hands down that decision, it will have major ramifica-
tions not only for attorneys, plaintiffs, and defendants in such cases, but also for
the medical and insurance industries in general in Nevada.
If the cap must be applied per plaintiff in wrongful deaths it will signifi-
cantly increase the amount of money at stake in lawsuits filed by multiple heirs
of dead patients.23 In each case where there are four or more heirs, for example,
a per-plaintiff application of the cap increases the potential maximum award for
noneconomic damages by more than a million dollars.24 That is why plaintiffs’
lawyers argue for application of the cap to plaintiffs individually.25 They con-
tend that this interpretation of the statute better serves justice because when one
incident of medical malpractice causes pain and suffering for multiple plain-
tiffs—as typically happens when one incident of medical malpractice kills a
person who has several heirs—the plaintiffs cannot be fairly or adequately
compensated by a maximum award of $350,000 in noneconomic damages that
has to be divided among them.26 The per-plaintiff application of the cap also
would offer more contingency fee potential for plaintiffs’ lawyers, which
would, in turn, provide an incentive for more lawyers to represent more victims
of medical malpractice.27 Advocates of the per-incident application counter that
the plaintiffs has a separate cause of action under the med mal cap statute and wrongful
death statute), with Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5, at 2 (denying plaintiffs’
motion seeking application of per-heir application of med mal cap; finding one cap for all
plaintiffs), and Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 6 (finding that plaintiffs could recover no
more than $350,000 in noneconomic damages, collectively).
21 Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3 (“The Court notes that the issues raised in the instant
Motion have provoked significant controversy, and therefore encourages the Nevada
Supreme Court to take this issue up on a writ, if pursued.”).
22 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 2; Villegas Mandamus Petition,
supra note 7, at 1.
23 Nevada’s wrongful death statute, NRS § 41.085, has been interpreted to provide a cause
of action to each heir. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (2011). See also infra Part IV. NRS
§ 41.085 also provides for an action by the personal representative of the decedent’s estate,
but that action would be for special damages, so it is not relevant to the question examined
by this Note. See, e.g., Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 34:42–34:48.
24 Under the per-action interpretation of the med mal cap that aggregates all plaintiffs as a
class, four heirs could receive a maximum of $350,000 in noneconomic damages, but under
the per-plaintiff interpretation, if each heir were to receive $350,000, the total judgment
would be $1.4 million.
25 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Blanco-Cuevas, M.D.’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Single Statutory Cap on Non-Economic Damages and Counter-
Motion to Declare N.R.S. 41A.035 Unconstitutional at 3–10, Tremblay v. Blanco-Cuevas,
No. A577086 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 7197774, at *2–*7 [hereinafter
Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment]; Motion for Order Confirming the Applicable
Damage Cap Required Under NRS 41A.035 at 4–9, Villegas v. Sheikh, No. A561497 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 6869757, at *3–*5 [hereinafter Villegas Motion To
Confirm Damage Cap].
26 See, e.g., Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 26–27.
27 See, e.g., Caitlin Haney, Trend Continues for Personal Injury Damage Caps, 38 LITIG.
NEWS, Winter 2013, at 4, 5 (explaining how damage caps affect plaintiffs’ ability to obtain
lawyers). A Las Vegas attorney who handled many medical malpractice cases prior to the
passage of the med mal cap statute in 2004 explains that he stopped taking such cases and
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the cap must be applied per incident to achieve the goal of lowering medical
malpractice insurance rates so that Nevada can retain and attract enough health
care providers.28
There is an additional reason that establishing the correct application of
the cap in cases of fatal medical malpractice is a thorny matter for both sides
and the court: it could be the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent. It could
force the justices to confront two larger and even more potent questions. The
first is: Are there separate caps for each defendant or does one cap apply collec-
tively to all the defendants being sued for any one occurrence of medical mal-
practice?29 Take, for example, a plaintiff suing four defendants—a surgeon,
nurse, anesthesiologist, and hospital—regarding one incident of medical mal-
practice. Is that plaintiff’s maximum possible total recovery for noneconomic
damages $350,000, or is it $350,000 times four? The second question is the
overarching one of whether the limiting of noneconomic damages is constitu-
tional. Numerous other state supreme courts around the nation have had to rule
on challenges to the constitutionality of statutory limits on damages and have
reached different conclusions.30 Advocates of the per-plaintiff application of
the cap in Nevada typically argue that the med mal cap is unconstitutional.31
ordered the attorneys in his firm to stop taking such cases after the statute took effect
because the cases “just didn’t pencil out anymore.” Doug McMurdo, $2.3 Million or
$800,000 the Question in Court, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 5, 2009, at 1B. He also says
many other firms did the same, for the same reason. Id. “Now, people who are impacted by
bad doctors will have a hard time finding a good, experienced attorney to represent them.”
Id. Lawyers are no longer taking meritorious cases because they are no longer economically
feasible. Harasim, Reforms Still Divide, supra note 15, at B1 (describing a man who was left
nearly blind by alleged medical malpractice but who was unable to find an attorney to take
his case because, they told him, his case was “economically unfeasible”).
28 E.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 33 (“Any reading of the statute which
allows for multiple awards negates its purpose. The goal was to lower damage awards in an
effort to lower malpractice insurance costs and improve access to health care in Nevada—a
result that will not be achieved if a loophole is created in the statute.”).
29 In fact, that question is combined with the wrongful death context question in med mal
cap cases examined in this Note. See, e.g., Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment,
supra note 25, at 4–5. The plaintiffs in Tremblay v. Blanco-Cuevas and Villegas v. Sheikh
argued that the cap should be applied separately to various defendants joined in the same
action. Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 5–6. See also, e.g.,
Mehanna Order, supra note 13, at 4 (ruling that the med mal cap applies on a per-plaintiff,
per-defendant basis, rather than on a per-incident basis); Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap,
supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]he applicable damage cap is for ALL Plaintiffs and ALL
Defendants.”).
30 See, e.g., Haney, supra note 27, at 4–5 (noting that in October 2012 the Kansas Supreme
Court became the sixteenth state supreme court to conclude that statutory caps on non-eco-
nomic damages are constitutional and listing seven states that have struck down caps on
noneconomic damages as unconstitutional); Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medi-
cal Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 515, 515 (2005).
31 See, e.g., Paul Harasim, Mother’s Death Puts Lawsuit Limits on Line, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Aug. 1, 2010, at B1 [hereinafter Harasim, Mother’s Death]. See also, e.g., Tremblay
Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 6–11; Villegas Motion To Confirm
Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 6–9.
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Those broader questions, however, are beyond the scope of this Note and are
left to future scholarship.32
This Note, instead, focuses specifically on whether Nevada law entitles
each heir of a person killed by medical malpractice to recover up to $350,000
in noneconomic damages. Part I illustrates the med mal cap question in the
wrongful death context through two cases in which Eighth Judicial District
judges—in a span of two weeks—reached opposite conclusions as to how the
cap should be applied.33 Part II provides a thumbnail history of Nevada’s med
mal cap and highlights why the history is important to the arguments on both
sides of this debate. Part III examines the language of the statute, the dispute
over the meaning of “an action” in the statute and the statute’s use of singular
nouns, and Part IV examines the interplay potential conflicts between the medi-
cal malpractice cap statute and the state’s wrongful death statute and how they
might be harmonized. Part V considers whether the statute is ambiguous and
analyzes what is arguably the most critical issue—the legislative intent behind
the statute. Part VI examines whether an unpublished Nevada Supreme Court
order was a de facto determination that the cap applies per plaintiff. Part VII
then considers the arguments for and against using California case law—and
which California case law should be used, if any—to resolve this dispute. Part
VIII examines the practical and policy implications of one application of the
cap versus the other application.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the med mal cap should be applied
per plaintiff in wrongful death cases. The text of the statute, particularly its use
of singular nouns, leads to such a conclusion, and so does the meaning that the
Nevada Supreme Court has attached to “an action” when used in the contexts
of damages caps and wrongful death. Moreover, the only practical way to
assess legislative intent for a statutory initiative is through the ballot materials
provided to voters, and those materials told voters that the cap would apply to a
singular “plaintiff,” and that the change being made to the existing cap statute
was the removal of the two exceptions to the cap. The ballot materials did not
tell voters that the new cap, unlike the old cap, would apply to plaintiffs in the
aggregate.
32 The first of the two larger questions would require more time and pages than this Note
has been allocated. As for the second, the constitutionality of tort damages caps has been
covered by many other authors, including: Haney, supra note 27, at 4; Kelly & Mello, supra
note 30, at 515; Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a
National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV.
773, 775 (2004); Kelly Kotur, Note, An Extreme Response or a Necessary Reform?
Revealing How Caps on Noneconomic Damages Actually Affect Medical Malpractice Vic-
tims and Malpractice Insurance Rates, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 880, 882 (2006) (sug-
gesting that the cap’s discrimination between similarly-situated groups of medical
malpractice victims might violate equal protection); Damian Stutz, Note, Non-Economic-
Damage Award Caps in Wisconsin: Why Ferdon Was (Almost) Right and the Law Is Wrong,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 105, 129.
33 Compare Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]he applicable damages
cap is for ALL Plaintiffs and ALL Defendants.”), with Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2
(finding the cap does not apply to plaintiff heirs in the aggregate “because each of the plain-
tiffs has a separate cause of action under NRS 41.085(2), and NRS 41A.035 uses the term
‘plaintiff’ in the singular”).
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I. A TALE OF TWO RULINGS IN CLARK COUNTY
Several of the important issues and implications are more easily under-
stood when viewed through the lenses of two relatively recent Clark County
cases in which two trial judges, just two weeks apart, came to opposing conclu-
sions about the proper application of the med mal cap statute.34 In both cases,
multiple heirs argued for the cap to be applied separately to each of them while
the defendants argued noneconomic damages could only be $350,000 maxi-
mum in each case, to be divided among the respective heirs.35
In Villegas v. Sheikh, the plaintiffs were the husband and six children of
the late Adeline Villegas.36 The 65-year-old woman’s stomach pain, nausea,
and vomiting were severe enough to send her to Southern Hills Hospital and
Medical Center’s emergency room on August 6, 2007, and after initial tests, a
doctor there concluded she might have pancreatitis and needed to be hospital-
ized immediately.37 Mrs. Villegas asked to be transferred to a hospital con-
tracted with her insurance company, so the doctor transferred her to Spring
Valley Hospital Medical Center with orders for a computerized tomography, or
CT, scan of her abdomen to be done as soon as possible so the report of that
scan could be provided to her physician.38 She was transported to Spring Val-
ley Hospital that same afternoon, but the CT scan apparently was never
performed.39
At Spring Valley, Dr. Mahmud A. Sheikh was in charge of Mrs. Villegas’s
care.40 He determined she most likely had pancreatitis, and he allegedly
ordered the staff to give Villegas a clear liquid diet.41 Villegas had been persist-
ently vomiting, however, and the standard of care in treating pancreatitis with
significant vomiting, or any abdominal pain with vomiting, is to prescribe for
the patient to receive nothing by mouth and instead provide nourishment and
medication in a non-oral way, typically intravenously.42 That way the patient is
protected from not only the possibility of inhaling her own vomit but also the
damage that might be caused by food or medication going into an inflamed or
damaged intestinal tract.43
About ten hours after Mrs. Villegas was admitted to Spring Valley Hospi-
tal, she developed septic shock, a life-threatening condition caused by severe
34 Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]he applicable damages cap is for
ALL Plaintiffs and ALL Defendants.”); Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (denying motion
for partial summary judgment regarding single statutory cap on noneconomic damage
“because each of the plaintiffs has a separate cause of action under NRS 41.085(2), and NRS
41A.035 uses the term ‘plaintiff’ in the singular”).
35 Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 3–4; Villegas Motion To
Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 2.
36 Complaint at 1–2, Villegas v. Sheikh, No. A561497 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Apr. 22, 2008), 2008
WL 8096404, at *1–*2.
37 Id. at 3.
38 Id. at 3–4.
39 Id. at 4.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 4–5.
43 Id. at 5.
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infection.44 She died the following day.45 The autopsy revealed that she had a
stomach ulcer that had burst, leaving a hole through which her stomach con-
tents had spilled into her abdominal cavity.46
A Hawaii native who had lived in Las Vegas for about a year, Mrs. Ville-
gas had been an employee of the Diagnostic Center of Medicine,47 of all
places. In addition to her husband and six children, Mrs. Villegas was survived
by ten grandchildren and three great-grandchildren, as well as five brothers,
three sisters, and their families.48 Mrs. Villegas’s husband and the couple’s
children sued Dr. Sheikh and Valley Health System, doing business as Spring
Valley Hospital, alleging that medical malpractice—the failure to do the CT
scan within four hours of her admission into the hospital, misdiagnosis of her
illness, the oral feeding, and Dr. Sheikh’s failure to dictate his admitting note
until more than a month after Mrs. Villegas was admitted to the hospital—
caused Mrs. Villegas to needlessly suffer and die.49
“This was a woman who was in good health otherwise,” the family’s law-
yer, Peter Wetherall told a Las Vegas newspaper reporter.50 “And now a hus-
band can’t enjoy his retirement years with his wife, and her children and
grandchildren are robbed of her affection. The pain and suffering here are very
legitimate.”51
Under the one-cap-per-incident interpretation of NRS 41A.035, the maxi-
mum compensation available to Mrs. Villegas’s seven heirs for their pain and
suffering is $350,000. If Mrs. Villegas’s children and husband evenly divided
that $350,000, each heir could receive $50,000 at most. Each heir likely would
receive far less than $50,000, however, because fees of attorneys and medical
expert witnesses typically are paid out of awards for noneconomic damages.52
The per-plaintiff application of the cap, on the other hand, would have
increased the potential recovery by millions of dollars for Adeline Villegas’s
heirs and estate.53
But, in an order filed January 11, 2010, Eighth Judicial District Judge
Stefany Miley ruled that the med mal cap applies to the class of plaintiffs in the
aggregate.54 She reached the same conclusion about the cap application as
Judge Elliott had in Washoe County three years earlier. He had found “that the
language of NRS 41A.035 and NRS 41.085 support[ed] Defendants’ argument
44 Id. at 4.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Obituaries, Villegas, Adeline, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 11, 2007, at B4.
48 Id.
49 Complaint, supra note 36, at 5–7.
50 Harasim, Mother’s Death, supra note 31, at B1.
51 Id.
52 See Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Nonmonetary Losses: An Integrated Answer to
the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 193, 263 (2009) (“[P]laintiffs rely on noneconomic damages to pay their attor-
neys’ fees.”); see also Joelle Babula, New Liability Laws Target of Petition, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A1 (plaintiffs’ attorney Gerald Gillock noting the upfront cost of
expert witnesses for medical malpractice cases).
53 Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 5–6.
54 Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 6; but see Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5,
at 2.
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that the noneconomic damages cap limits the recovery to $350,000 to Plain-
tiff’s collectively.”55 In his six-page order, Judge Elliott provided the analysis
that led to his conclusion.56 In the case he heard, the defendants made most, if
not all, of the same arguments made by other defendants sued for alleged medi-
cal malpractice resulting in death.57 Several of those arguments and Judge Elli-
ott’s agreement with them will be considered later in this Note. Although Judge
Miley did not explain her analysis in her single-paragraph order, it stands to
reason that her analysis was similar to Judge Elliott’s, given that similar argu-
ments were made in both cases58 and given that Judge Miley’s order noted that
the court had “considered the [m]otion, [o]ppositions and [r]eply thereto”
before finding that “per NRS 41A.035, the applicable damage cap is for ALL
Plaintiffs and ALL Defendants.”59
Just two weeks after Judge Miley’s ruling, however, one of her fellow
Eighth Judicial District Court judges, Mark Denton, reached the opposite con-
clusion in Tremblay v. Blanco-Cuevas,60 which was also a medical malpractice
wrongful death case brought by multiple plaintiffs.61 The plaintiff alleged that
Antonius “Tony” Konst’s death was caused by failures to “timely and appropri-
ately diagnose and treat complications after a routine gall bladder surgery.”62
“Mr. Konst died as a result of infected intra abdominal abcesses [sic] and sepsis
that culminated in multisystem organ failure.”63 The plaintiffs were Mr.
Konst’s two daughters, three sons, and a special administratrix appointed to
pursue claims on behalf of Mr. Konst’s estate.64
One of the defendant doctors filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
asking Judge Denton to find that the med mal cap was $350,000 total, no matter
the number of plaintiffs.65 Judge Denton denied the motion and based his rejec-
55 Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 6.
56 Id. at 3–6.
57 Id. (summarizing the arguments of defendant for per-incident application of the cap); see
also Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 4–13 (defendant’s argu-
ment for per-incident application of the cap).
58 Compare Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 4–8 (plaintiffs’
argument for per-plaintiff application of the cap), and Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage
Cap, supra note 25, at 4–13 (defendant’s argument for per-incident application of the cap),
with Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 3–6 (summarizing the arguments of plaintiff and defen-
dant regarding the proper application of the cap).
59 Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note 5, at 2. The second prong of Judge Miley’s
conclusion (“ALL Defendants”) rejects the plaintiffs’ argument, explained generally in the
Introduction supra and referenced in supra note 29 that a separate cap may be applied to
each defendant in a lawsuit.
60 Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (finding the med mal cap does not apply to plaintiff
heirs in the aggregate “because each of the plaintiffs has a separate cause of action under
NRS 41.085(2), and NRS 41A.035 uses the term ‘plaintiff’ in the singular”).
61 Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 2. The plaintiffs were five
heirs and a special administratrix for the estate.
62 Id. at 2 n.1.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2.
65 Defendant Blanco-Cuevas, M.D.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Single
Statutory Cap on Non-Economic Damages at 4, Tremblay v. Blanco-Cuevas, No. A577086
(Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2009), 2009 WL 7197773, at *3 [hereinafter Blanco-Cuevas Motion
for Summary Judgment].
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ312.txt unknown Seq: 10 17-JUN-13 10:37
992 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:983
tion of the $350,000-per-lawsuit interpretation not just on the med mal cap
statute, but also on Nevada’s wrongful death statute,66 as explained in Part IV.
Judge Denton’s ruling, in turn, helped spur the Villegas family’s attorney,
Peter Wetherall, to seek writ review by the Nevada Supreme Court regarding
Judge Miley’s opposite conclusion in Villegas v. Sheikh.67 The court granted
Wetherall’s petition, all parties briefed the case for the justices, and the court
heard oral arguments en banc in March 2011.68 But before the justices could
rule—and presumably resolve the longstanding dispute about the proper appli-
cation of the med mal cap—the case settled, so the court dismissed it.69
II. THE HISTORY OF NRS SECTION 41A.035 AND REASONS WHY ITS
PREDECESSOR STATUTE IS KEY TO BOTH SIDES’ ARGUMENTS
The history of Nevada’s current med mal cap statute, NRS 41A.035, plays
an important part in the arguments regarding how the cap should be applied.
The current statute is a revision of NRS 41A.031, which was passed by a spe-
cial session of the Nevada Legislature in August 200270 in reaction to a “medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis.”71 Nevada, especially Southern Nevada, did
not have enough doctors, particularly in some specialties such as obstetrics.72
Doctors complained they were being “forced to leave the state, retire early or
limit their services because they [could not] find medical malpractice insurance
or afford the” rates for the insurance in Nevada.73
The state’s doctors clamored for tort reform to limit attorney fees and cap
jury awards, saying it was the only viable long-term solution. Insurance compa-
nies blamed rises in medical malpractice insurance rates on jury awards and
“frivolous” lawsuits. Trial attorneys countered that the companies had raised
rates to make up for not only “a bad economy, lack of investment returns and
poor underwriting skills,” but also the insurance companies’ own over-eager-
ness to insure even bad doctors to gain market share.74
Nevada lawmakers were “vigorously lobbied” as to how to limit the dam-
ages that victims of medical malpractice could recover,75 and the med mal cap
statute that emerged from the 2002 special legislative session wound up being a
66 Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (denying motion for partial summary judgment
regarding single statutory cap on noneconomic damage “because each of the plaintiffs has a
separate cause of action under NRS 41.085(2), and NRS 41A.035 uses the term ‘plaintiff’ in
the singular”).
67 Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 5.
68 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10.
69 Order Dismissing Villegas Petition, supra note 9, at 1.
70 2002 Nev. Stat. 3 (2002) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.031) (repealed 2004).
71 Babula, supra note 15, at A1. See Justin Shiroff, Shielding Hippocrates: Nevada’s
Expanded Pleading Standard for Medical Malpractice Actions and the Need for Legislative
Reform, 12 NEV. L.J. 231, 235–37 (2011) (describing the crisis); see also Universal Health
Petition, supra note 2, at 3.
72 See Babula, supra note 15, at A1.
73 Babula, supra note 52, at A1.
74 Babula, supra note 15, at A1.
75 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 3.
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compromise that included exceptions to the cap.76 The pertinent portions of the
2002 statute mandated that “in an action for damages for medical malpractice
or dental malpractice, the noneconomic damages awarded to each plaintiff from
each defendant must not exceed $350,000” except upon a showing, by clear
and convincing evidence, of gross negligence or exceptional circumstances.77
On September 20, 2002, a Southern Nevada doctor filed the Keep Our
Doctors in Nevada, or KODIN, initiative petition with the Nevada Secretary of
State’s office.78 The goal of the petition was to repeal the fledgling NRS
41A.031 and some of its complementary statutes and to substitute a new statu-
tory scheme.79 A contemporaneous newspaper report based in part on an inter-
view with the doctor who filed the petition described the intent of the initiative
this way: “The doctors want to abolish new exceptions to caps on pain and
suffering judgments and place limits on attorney fees. They want to ensure that
doctors cannot be forced to pay an entire jury award if they are found only
partially liable . . . .”80
KODIN, funded almost exclusively by the medical and insurance indus-
tries,81 hired a company82 that collected the requisite number of signatures on
petitions, and as a result the Secretary of State validated the initiative in
December 2002.83 Per the Nevada Constitution, the initiative then went to the
Nevada Legislature, and because the 2003 Legislature did not enact the pro-
posed statute within the time limit set by the constitution and took no further
action on the initiative, the initiative was placed on the ballot of the next suc-
ceeding general election in November 2004.84 Fifty-nine percent of voters
statewide then approved “Ballot Question 3,” as the initiative was titled at the
polls.85
Among the questions at the heart of the debate over the correct application
of the cap are not only what changes the new statute made, but also what
changes voters were told it would make, how those voters were informed, and
how the intention of voters who approved the new med mal cap statute should
76 Sean Whaley, Lawmakers Critical of Petition to Alter Medical Malpractice Law, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 4, 2002, at B1; see also Babula, supra note 52, at A1 (describing
“several aspects of tort reform that doctors failed to get included in” NRS 41A.031).
77 2002 Nev. Stat. 3, 6 (2002) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.031) (repealed 2004).
78 Babula, supra note 52, at A1.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 See Nevada 2004 Ballot Measures, Keep Our Doctors In Nevada, NAT’L INST. ON
MONEY IN STATE POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/committee.
phtml?c=1325 (last visited May 14, 2013) (showing compilations of contribution amounts,
names of contributors, industries that provided the largest total contributions, and break-
downs of contributions by economic interest and indicating that approximately eighty-eight
percent of the KODIN’s $3.84 million war chest for supporting the passage of the initiative
to enact the revised med mal cap statute came from the health and insurance industries).
82 Babula, supra note 52, at A1.
83 Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 17 n.4; see also Joelle Babula, Doctors
Group’s Petition Forces Legislature to Consider Proposal, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 3,
2002, at A1.
84 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 3; Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7,
at 17 n.4.
85 2004 Official General Election Results, NEV. SECRETARY OF STATE (Nov. 2, 2004), http:/
/nvsos.gov/SOSelectionPages/results/2004General/ElectionSummary.aspx.
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be discerned. Advocates of the per-plaintiff interpretation say determinations
about the knowledge and intent of those voters must be based on the ballot
material the Nevada Secretary of State provided to them,86 and the only change
that ballot material said the new law would make regarding the application of
the cap was that the new statute would eliminate the exceptions for gross negli-
gence and exceptional circumstances.87 Advocates of the per-incident interpre-
tation, on the other hand, say voter knowledge and intent should be judged by
the contemporaneous media reports about the initiative and the legislative
intent behind Ballot Question 3, an intent the per-incident advocates argue is
evident in the vast legislative record related to discussion of the KODIN initia-
tive and alternatives to it proposed in the 2003 legislative session.88 The propo-
nents of per-incident application of the cap also emphasize that the 2004
changes to the cap statute included removing the “each plaintiff” language,
which they say was aimed at changing the applicability of the cap and was
understood by voters to mean that the new statute would change the application
to one cap per incident of medical malpractice.89
III. “IN AN ACTION,” SINGULAR NOUNS, AND PLAIN LANGUAGE
Nevada’s current med mal cap statute is just one sentence:
In an action for injury or death against a provider of health care based upon
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic damages, but
the amount of noneconomic damages awarded in such an action must not exceed
$350,000.90
The arguments over the meaning and proper application of the statute start
with the sentence’s third word—“action.”91 “The interpretation of [the med mal
cap statute] turns on the definition of ‘action.’ ”92 Those who say the cap
applies per incident contend that “an action” means an entire lawsuit; those
who say the cap applies per plaintiff argue that “an action” means each claim
86 See Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 6, 20; see also Petitioners’ Joint Reply
in Support of Their Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition at 15–18, Villegas v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825 (Nev. Sept. 3, 2010) (petition
dismissed May 31, 2011) [hereinafter Villegas Reply in Support].
87 See, e.g., Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 40:35–41:06.
88 See, e.g., Real Parties in Interest Valley Health System, LLP, d/b/a Spring Valley Hospi-
tal Medical Center’s Answering Brief at 8–11, Villegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825 (Nev. July 2, 2010) [hereinafter Valley Health System Answering
Brief].
89 See, e.g., id. at 9–11.
90 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2011).
91 See Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 13–14; Blanco-Cuevas Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, supra note 65, at 5; Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra
note 25, at 3–6; Defendant Valley Health System, LLC d/b/a Spring Valley Hospital’s
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Confirming the Applicable Damage Cap at 4–7,
No. A561497 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2009), 2009 WL 6869758, at *3–*5 [hereinafter Valley
Hospital’s Opposition]; Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 4–7.
92 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 13; see also Villegas Oral Argument, supra
note 10, at 2:48–2:54 (Andre Mura, pro hac vice attorney for petitioner, stating the parties
agree that a central question is the meaning of “in an action”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ312.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-JUN-13 10:37
Spring 2013] ONE FOR ALL HEIRS OR ONE FOR EACH? 995
within a wrongful death lawsuit.93 “Action” is also a key word in the Nevada
wrongful death statute.
The argument that “action” means “lawsuit” is based, in part, on the fact
that several of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure can be read together to
indicate that “a civil action”—because it includes the original claim and any
crossclaims, counterclaims and third-party claims—means a judicial proceed-
ing as a whole, not just an individual cause of action.94 The Nevada Supreme
Court relied, in part, on that argument in 1989’s United Association of Journey-
men & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry v. Manson, wherein
the court found “action” to mean an entire lawsuit.95 The court also had used
that definition at least as far back as 1934, noting that the Nevada Constitution
states that “[t]here shall be but one form of civil action, and law and equity may
be administered in the same action.”96 The court followed up the excerpt from
the state constitution with a quote from a venerable legal lexicon: “An ‘action’
is a judicial proceeding, either in law or equity, to obtain certain relief at [the]
hands of [the] court.”97
Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines an “action” as “[a] civil or crim-
inal judicial proceeding.”98 The entry quotes an 1885 book about pleadings and
practice, which says:
An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right,
the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. . . . More
accurately, it is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a deter-
mination, will result in a judgment or decree.99
The Black’s entry for “action” goes on to quote an 1899 book that states:
“The terms ‘action’ and ‘suit’ are nearly if not quite synonymous.”100
93 E.g., Blanco-Cuevas Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 65, at 5; Valley Hospi-
tal’s Opposition, supra note 91, at 4–5.
94 See NEV. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil
action.’ ”).
95 United Ass’n of Journeymen v. Manson, 783 P.2d 955, 957–58 (1989) (“NRCP 41(e)
gives five years for trial of an ‘action’, not of a ‘claim.’ Unlike a claim, an action includes
the original claim and any crossclaims, counterclaims, and third-party claims. In fact, NRCP
41(c) specifically states that the rule applies to crossclaims, counterclaims, and third-party
claims. NRCP 2 states that ‘[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as “civil
action” ’ . . . Thus, the original claim and any crossclaims, counterclaims and third-party
claims are all part of one ‘action.’ ”).
96 Seaborn v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 29 P.2d 500, 504–05 (Nev. 1934) (quoting NEV.
CONST. art. 6, § 14) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. at 505 (quoting 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 187 (3d Series) (some internal quotation
marks omitted).
98 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (9th ed. 2009).
99 Id. (quoting 1 MORRIS M. ESTEE, ESTEE’S PLEADINGS, PRACTICE, AND FORMS § 3, at 1
(Carter P. Pomeroy ed., 3d ed. 1885)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 Id. (quoting EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3 (2d ed. 1899)). The rest of the excerpt in Black’s reveals that the distinction
between the two words was already dissolving more than 113 years ago and is no longer
applicable today:
[L]awyers usually speak of proceedings in courts of law as “actions,” and of those in courts of
equity as “suits.” In olden time there was a more marked distinction, for an action was consid-
ered as terminating when judgment was rendered, the execution forming no part of it. A suit, on
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But despite “action” having been defined as “lawsuit” for more than a
century, there is a counterargument that “action” has come to mean “cause of
action” in Nevada, particularly in the context of damages cap and wrongful
death statutes. First, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure were copied from,
and are identical to, the corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An
advisory note to FRCP 2 indicates that the “one form of action” language was
simply an acknowledgement that suits in law and equity have been merged.101
The main thrust of the argument against defining “action” as “lawsuit,” how-
ever, is that, at least in the context of statutory limits on damages and wrongful
death claims, the state’s high court has made “action” a term of art meaning
“cause of action.”102 In Parker v. Chrysler Motors, the court’s decision effec-
tively defined “an action” in the wrongful death statute as “cause of action”—
even while the court, in its decision, used “an action” to refer to the lawsuit in
general.103
The court further defined “action” as “cause of action” in the context of a
statutory cap on damages in County of Clark v. Upchurch and Arnesano v.
State, opinions that came eight and nine years, respectively, after Manson.104
In 1998, the Upchurch court analyzed NRS 41.035, which, like the med mal
cap, is a statutory limit on damages, albeit damages recoverable from the State
of Nevada and/or its political subdivisions as a result of the state’s limited
waiver of sovereign immunity for tort liability.105 The pertinent portion of NRS
41.035 effective at that time106 noted:
the other hand, included the execution. The word “suit,” as used in the Judiciary Act of 1784 and
later Federal statutes, applies to any proceeding in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues
in such court the remedy which the law affords him.
Id. at 32–33 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
101 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s note 2 (1937) (“Reference to actions at law
or suits in equity in all statutes should now be treated as referring to the civil action pre-
scribed in these rules.”).
102 See, e.g., Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 11, 13–15, 25.
103 Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 502 P.2d 111, 112 (1972).
104 Cnty. of Clark, ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 961 P.2d 754, 757, 759 (Nev. 1998)
(considering the words “an award for damages in an action sounding in tort” in NRS 41.035
to be a statutory limitation on damages, and noting that “[t]his court has interpreted the
statutory limitation in NRS 41.035 to apply to each cause of action by each claimant”);
Arnesano v. State, 942 P.2d 139, 141–42, 145 (Nev. 1997), abrogated by Martinez v.
Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2007) as to sovereign immunity of physician employed by
state university medical school. Arnesano affirmed an award to three heirs on a per-person,
per-claim basis up to the limit of the statutory cap in NRS 41.035, a statute that refers to:
An award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought under NRS 41.031 or against a
present or former officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision, immune contractor
or state legislator arising out of an act or omission within the scope of his public duties or
employment may not exceed the sum of $50,000, exclusive of interest computed from the date of
judgment, to or for the benefit of any claimant. An award may not include any amount as exem-
plary or punitive damages.
Id. at 140–41 n.1 (emphasis added); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035 (1995).
105 Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 759.
106 The limit in the statute was raised to $75,000 on October 1, 2007 and $100,000 on
October 1, 2011. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035 (2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.
us/Statutes/74th/Stats200725.html#Stats200725page3025.
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An award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought under NRS 41.031
or against a present or former officer or employee of the state or any political subdi-
vision, immune contractor or state legislator arising out of an act or omission within
the scope of his public duties or employment may not exceed the sum of $50,000,
exclusive of interest computed from the date of judgment, to or for the benefit of any
claimant. An award may not include any amount as exemplary or punitive
damages.107
In reaching its conclusion that the limit applied on a “per-person or per-claim-
ant” basis rather than on a “per-incident or occurrence” or a “per-claim”
basis,108 the Upchurch court construed the statute’s use of “an action” to mean
“cause of action.”109
In 1997, the Arnesano court considered how the NRS section 41.035 stat-
utory limit on damages should apply in a wrongful death case, and the court
viewed the three plaintiffs in that case as each having “an action” for the pur-
poses of the damages limitation.110 The court affirmed an award under NRS
41.035 to the three heirs on a per-person, per-claim basis.111 And in 1972, the
court in Parker read the term “action” in NRS 12.090 to mean that each heir
had a cause of action for wrongful death against which the statute of limitations
ran separately.112
Upchurch, Arnesano, and Parker support the argument that, at least in the
context of statutory limits on damages and wrongful death claims, the court has
made “action” a term of art meaning “cause of action.”
The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure existed when the Court decided
Parker, Arnesano, and Upchurch, and the court apparently saw no conflict
between its determination about the meaning of “action” in those three cases
and the rules’ statement about an “action.” The statutory scheme that was
before the court in Upchurch and Arnesano is comparable to that of the med
mal cap because material words are identical;113 each statute refers to an
“action,” and in Upchurch and Arnesano the court’s rulings indicated that ref-
erence to “action” in the statute at issue in those cases was, in fact, a reference
to a cause of action.114 The Upchurch ruling also pointed to other Nevada
107 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
108 Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 759.
109 Id. (“This court has interpreted the statutory limitation in NRS 41.035 to apply to each
cause of action by each claimant.”).
110 Id. at 761 (discussing Arnesano’s findings as to “an action,” claims of actions and
awards to heirs in Arnesano).
111 Id.
112 Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 502 P.2d 111, 112 (1972).
113 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2009) (“In an action for injury or death”), with
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1995) (“An award for damages in an action”); Compare also
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2009) (“based upon professional negligence”), and NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41A.015 (2009) (defining professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission to
act”), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1995) (“arising out of an act or omission”).
114 See Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 759 (considering the words “an award for damages in an
action sounding in tort” in NRS 41.035, a statutory limitation on damages, and noting “[t]his
court has interpreted the statutory limitation in NRS 41.035 to apply to each cause of action
by each claimant”); Arnesano affirmed an award to three heirs on a per-person, per-claim
basis up to the limit of the statutory cap in NRS 41.035. Arnesano v. State, 942 P.2d 139,
141–42 n.1, 145 (Nev. 1997).
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Supreme Court rulings that supported its interpretation of “action.”115
Upchurch was the sole citation in the conclusions of law section of Judge
Sturman’s 2012 ruling in favor of the per-plaintiff application of the cap.116
And during the Villegas oral arguments, one of the Nevada justices talked
about the Upchurch interpretation of “action” as if it could be a key to resolv-
ing the question. When Dennis Kennedy, the attorney who argued on behalf of
the respondent hospital system in Villegas, attempted to steer the court toward
legislative history for the answer to the med mal cap question, one justice
pointedly asked Mr. Kennedy whether anything in the legislative history of the
med mal cap “expressly addressed, rebutted, or qualified” the interpretation that
the court had attached to the word “action” in Upchurch, and Mr. Kennedy
acknowledged that nothing in the legislative history expressly did.117
Mr. Kennedy pointed, instead, to what he and other advocates of the per-
incident application of the med mal cap contend is a flaw in the argument to
apply the Upchurch definition of “in an action” to the current med mal cap
statute. The cap statute with which Upchurch was concerned118 limited the tort
damages that government and certain government-related tortfeasors could be
ordered to pay “to or for the benefit of any claimant.”119 The 2002 version of
the med mal cap included similar language: “to each plaintiff from each defen-
dant,” but that language was left out of the 2004 version.120 The removal of “to
each plaintiff from each defendant” from the statute, defendants say, demon-
strates that the new med mal cap was intended to apply to plaintiffs in the
aggregate and that without this language the current cap does not apply to
“each plaintiff.”121 That argument also arises in a slightly different light in the
context of the debate over voter intent, examined in Part V.A. of this Note. But
even without the “each plaintiff” language, the statute can be read to mean that
the cap is applied per plaintiff if “action” means “cause of action.” The per-
plaintiff reading is possible because of the statute’s use of singular nouns, as is
discussed below. Under that reading, the “per plaintiff” language of the old
statute is unnecessary and would have been redundant in the current statute.
The intentionally restrictive singular use of the nouns in the new statute and the
115 See, e.g., Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 759–60 (citing State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370, 1373
(Nev. 1985); State v. Webster, 504 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Nev. 1972)).
116 Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3.
117 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 24:05–24:35. But, Mr. Kennedy added that
although the Upchurch interpretation was not expressly addressed anywhere in the legisla-
tive history, the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association’s lobbyist spoke on the issue in March
2003, when the lobbyist testified to the Senate Committee on Judiciary about the differences
between a competing bill and the law proposed by the initiative, pointing out that the com-
peting bill would provide a per-plaintiff, per-defendant cap that would allow each heir in a
wrongful death to have his own, independent claim for noneconomic damages, but under the
law proposed by the initiative the limit would be “$350,000 per event with no exceptions.”
Id. at 24:36–25:28. As explained in Part V(A), however, this Note argues that it does not
matter what was said in the Legislature about the initiative because the Legislature did not
enact the statute, the voters did.
118 Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 756–60 (regarding NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035 (1995)).
119 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (2011).
120 See, e.g., Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 12.
121 Id.
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use of “an action,” meaning “a cause of action” or “claim,” could convey the
same meaning as “to each plaintiff from each defendant” did in the old statute.
More importantly for the argument regarding Upchurch, the court did not
specifically tie Upchurch’s definition of “in an action” to the prior statute’s “to
or for the benefit of any claimant” language; the court did not rest its per-
plaintiff, per-claim reading on the “any claimant” phrase of the statute. In fact,
the phrase “any claimant” only appears in the opinion once, when the court
quotes the entire statute. Rather than tying its conclusion about the meaning of
“in an action” to the “any claimant” phrase, the Upchurch court states that
Nevada’s consistent legal precedent of interpreting the statute as allowing
plaintiffs to recover damages on a per-person, per-claim basis was consistent
with “the clear reading of [the statute], which uses the phrases ‘in an action’
(singular), as well as the phrase ‘arising out of an act or omission’ (again
singular).”122
The per-plaintiff application of the med mal cap is similarly supported by
the statutory scheme’s use of the singular for not only those same two phrases
identified in the Upchurch ruling but also other key words. In fact, all of the
statutory language that is significant to the med mal cap application question is
singular:
In an action for injury or death against a provider of health care based upon
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic damages, but
the amount of noneconomic damages awarded in such an action must not exceed
$350,000.123
Additionally, NRS 41A.015, which was also enacted  through Ballot Question
3, defines “professional negligence” as “a negligent act or omission” and uses
the singular form.124
If the intention had been for the cap to apply in the aggregate to all plain-
tiffs suing over any one incident, the statute could have—and arguably should
have—been written using the plural form, “plaintiffs.” Instead, the statute says
that in an action the plaintiff may be awarded up to $350,000. And although the
Nevada Revised Statutes’ preliminary chapter states, “[t]he singular number
includes the plural number, and the plural includes the singular,”125 that same
NRS section also includes an exception: singular and plural are not mutually
inclusive if “otherwise expressly provided in a particular statute or required by
the context.”126 When medical malpractice is fatal, the med mal cap statute
must be considered in the context of the wrongful death statute and that context
requires the singular, as explained in Part III of this Note.
The use of the singular in the med mal cap was noted by Judge Denton,
Judge Sturman, and Judge Silver as one of the main reasons each ruled in favor
of the per-plaintiff application of the cap.127
122 Upchurch, 961 P.2d at 761.
123 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2011) (emphasis added).
124 Id. § 41A.015.
125 Id. § 0.030.
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 See, e.g., Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2; Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3; Mehanna
Order, supra note 13, at 4–5.
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IV. HARMONIZING THE MED MAL CAP AND WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
Another basis for Judge Denton, Judge Sturman, and Judge Silver’s rul-
ings in favor of the per-plaintiff application of the cap was Nevada’s wrongful
death statute, NRS 41.085.128 But the statute was also a main reason that Judge
Elliott ruled the opposite way.129 As that indicates, the two sides of the med
mal cap debate also disagree about the meaning of the wrongful death statute,
which is understandable because the statute provides plenty of opportunity for
disagreement. The two sides ping-pong through the subsections of the wrongful
death statute in making their arguments.
First, subsection 2 says that when a person’s death “is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another, the heirs of the decedent and the personal
representatives of the decedent may each maintain an action for damages
against the person who caused the death.”130 Subsection 3 then refers to “[a]n
action brought by the heirs” and “the cause of action of that decedent brought
or maintained by the decedent’s personal representatives.”131
So does the statute mean each heir may maintain his own individual action
(plaintiffs’ argument), or does it mean the heirs have one action and the per-
sonal representatives of the decedent have their own action (defendants’ argu-
ment)?132 The plain language here may well favor the defendants’ reading of
the statute—“an action” (singular) brought by “the heirs” (plural), arguably is
most plainly read to mean one action filed by the heirs collectively.133 The
argument is that NRS 41.085(2) allows for, at most, two separate “actions”: one
brought by the heirs of the decedent for noneconomic damages and another
action brought by the personal representative of the estate for economic
damages.134
The Nevada Supreme Court must construe the provisions of the med mal
cap statute in compliance and conformance with other applicable statutory pro-
128 See Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2; Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3; Mehanna
Order, supra note 13, at 4.
129 Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 4–5 (noting that the court read the wrongful death statute
“as allowing only two separate actions: one brought by the personal representative and one
brought by the ‘heirs of the decedent’ collectively,” and that this reading was one of two
findings that guided the court’s conclusion that the heirs in the case could recover no more
than $350,000 in noneconomic damages, collectively).
130 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
131 Id. § 41.085(3) (emphasis added).
132 Id. § 41.085(2).
133 This is how Judge Elliott read the statute. See Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 4 (noting
that the court read the wrongful death statute “as allowing only two separate actions: one
brought by the personal representative and one brought by the ‘heirs of the decedent’
collectively”).
134 See, e.g., Blanco-Cuevas Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 65, at 7; Sieben
Order, supra note 4, at 4 (agreeing with defendants’ argument that the wrongful death statute
allows only two separate actions: one brought by the heirs of the decedent collectively and
one brought by the personal representative of the estate); see also Villegas Oral Argument,
supra note 10, at 33:57–34:50 (attorney Dan Polsenberg arguing on behalf of respondent Dr.
Shiekh, defendant in the underlying case, the wrongful death statute allows only two sepa-
rate actions: one brought by the heirs of the decedent collectively and one brought by the
personal representative of the estate, and noting that the latter is not an issue in the med mal
cap question because the personal representative’s damages are economic damages).
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visions.135 Therefore, defendants argue, the med mal cap statute cannot refer to
a damages cap applicable to each plaintiff heir because all the heirs are required
to sue collectively.136 Judge Elliott’s agreement with that reading of the wrong-
ful death statute was one of two findings137 that led him to rule that the med
mal cap applied collectively to a decedent’s heirs.138
Judges Denton, Sturman, and Silver, on the other hand, agreed with plain-
tiffs who focused on subsection 4 of the wrongful death statute, which
provides:
The heirs may prove their respective damages in the action brought pursuant to
subsection 2 and the court or jury may award each person pecuniary damages for the
person’s grief or sorrow, loss of probable support, companionship, society, comfort
and consortium, and damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement of the decedent.139
Under subsection 4, each heir would necessarily have his own cause of
action. That makes sense because one heir might have been very close to the
decedent, for example, while another heir had been estranged from the dece-
dent. Those two heirs would have different claims as a result of their different
degrees of pain or suffering. This is why the wrongful death statute dictates that
the heirs must prove “their respective damages,” which in turn leads to the
conclusion that the damages awardable to each heir are distinct and
individual.140
Defendants try to counter this by pointing to subsection 3 of the statute:
“An action brought by the heirs of a decedent pursuant to subsection 2 and the
cause of action of that decedent brought or maintained by the decedent’s per-
sonal representatives which arose out of the same wrongful act or neglect may
be joined.”141 Defendants argue that a part of the statute and the aims of judi-
cial efficiency and equity result in a requirement for all the heirs to bring their
claims in the same “action”142 to prevent a defendant from having to face a
series of lawsuits from different plaintiffs over the same death.143
But while the Parker analysis of NRS 12.090, the similarly worded prede-
cessor of the current wrongful death statute, did note that the “thrust” of the
statute “is to have all heirs join in one action,” it also emphasized that “[t]he
statute does not create a joint cause of action.”144
Each heir has a separate relational interest in the life of the deceased, and dam-
ages are determined according to those separate interests. The mere fact that the
135 See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 860 P.2d 720, 723 (Nev. 1993) (“Whenever possible,
this court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules and statutes.”).
136 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 19.
137 The other finding that guided Judge Elliott’s ruling was California’s interpretation of its
med mal cap. Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 4–5. The California comparison is the subject of
Section V of this Note.
138 See id. at 4–6 (agreeing with Defendants’ interpretation of the language of NRS
41A.035 and NRS 41.085 and concluding “that the language of NRS 41A.035 and NRS
41.085 support Defendants’ argument that the non-economic damages cap limits the recov-
ery to $350,000 to Plaintiff’s [sic] collectively”).
139 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085(4) (2011) (emphasis added).
140 See id.
141 Id. § 41.085(3).
142 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 18–19.
143 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 27:44–29:17.
144 Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 502 P.2d 111, 112 (Nev. 1972).
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judgment, if one is recovered, should be in a lump sum does not destroy separability
since either the heirs, or the court upon proper application, may apportion the award.
It follows, therefore, that a defense, good against the claim of one heir, is not fatal to
the others, any more than a settlement by one could bar the rights of all.145
So even if the claims of various heirs must (as opposed to “may” or
“should, whenever possible”) be joined in one lawsuit, each heir still has his
own cause of action. Indeed, Nevada’s wrongful death statute specifies individ-
ualized damages and an individualized proof of damages requirement for each
heir.146
Plaintiffs further argue that the plain language of the wrongful death stat-
ute yields a reading that the joinder to which the statute refers is actually join-
der into one lawsuit of the heirs’ various causes of action with the cause of
action of the personal representative of the estate.147 And the Nevada Supreme
Court, in at least three cases, has held that each heir maintains an individual
action for individual damages even if those actions are stated in a single
complaint.148
Several of Nevada’s rules of statutory interpretation are particularly perti-
nent to the med mal cap question in the wrongful death context because they
deal with harmonization of multiple statutes. Whenever possible, the court must
interpret a statute in harmony with other rules and statutes149 and must “con-
strue statutes such that no part of the statute is rendered nugatory or turned to
mere surplusage.”150 Plaintiffs argue that a per-plaintiff application of the med
mal cap rule for wrongful death cases harmonizes the two statutes, allowing the
two to co-exist without conflicting with each other. That argument, in a nut-
shell, goes like this: “Action” in the med mal cap statute means “cause of
action,” the wrongful death statute says each heir has a “cause of action,” and
the med mal cap statute says the cap applies to each action. Therefore, because
each heir has his own cause of action, each heir may collect noneconomic dam-
ages up to the $350,000 cap. A per-lawsuit construction of the cap, on the other
hand, would effectively negate or render superfluous the wrongful death stat-
ute’s individual-cause-of-action-for-each-heir and individual-damages-for-
each-heir provisions. It was this analytical framework that led Judge Denton to
hold in his order that the per-plaintiff application of the med mal cap is the only
way to harmonize the two statutes.151
145 Id.
146 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085(4).
147 See, e.g., Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 4.
148 See Cnty. of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 961 P.2d 754, 757, 761 (Nev.
1998) (explaining, approvingly, that the Arnesano court treated three heirs of the decedent as
maintaining individual actions for the purpose of a statutory damages limitation applicable to
“[a]n award for damages in an action”); State v. Webster, 504 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Nev. 1972);
see also Parker, 502 P.2d at 112 (“Each heir has a separate relational interest in the life of
the deceased, and damages are determined according to those separate interests.”).
149 See, e.g., Albios v. Horizon Cmtys., Inc., 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (Nev. 2006) (citing
Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 860 P.2d 720, 723 (Nev. 1993)); Allianz Ins. Co., 860 P.2d at
723; Bowyer v. Taack, 817 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Nev. 1991); City Council of Reno v. Reno
Newspapers, Inc.,  784 P.2d 974, 978 (Nev. 1989).
150 Albios, 132 P.3d at 1028.
151 Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (order finding that the cap applies per plaintiff).
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At the very least, a per-incident application of the cap in a case brought by
numerous plaintiffs could make it very difficult for a “district court judge [to]
tr[y] to figure out how in the world to allocate $350,000 (assuming the plain-
tiffs prevail) among the plaintiffs,”152 as Nevada Justice James Hardesty put it
during the Villegas oral arguments. Dennis Kennedy, the attorney who
defended Valley Health System in Villegas and other medical malpractice
cases,153 acknowledged to the court that the absence of guidance about alloca-
tion in the statute could raise some question about the enforceability of the
statute if the cap is applied per incident.154
Advocates of the per-incident application of the cap point to another
Nevada rule of statutory interpretation specific to harmonization.155 That rule
states that “[w]hen two statutes are clear and unambiguous but conflict with
each other when applied to a specific factual situation,” the court must attempt
to reconcile the statutes by attempting to read the statutory provisions in har-
mony, “provided that this interpretation does not violate legislative intent.”156
A per-plaintiff application of the cap would violate legislative intent, defend-
ants argue.157
The problem with this argument is this rule only applies in limited circum-
stances and as such the rule is arguably inapplicable here. First, in light of
different trial judges reaching diametrically opposed conclusions about the
meaning of the med mal cap statute, the statute is arguably neither clear nor
unambiguous, as further discussed in Part V. But even assuming for the sake of
argument that the statute is clear and unambiguous, a per-plaintiff application
would not violate “legislative intent” if we are examining the right legislative
intent. The med mal statute was passed by voter initiative, so the “legislative
intent” here is, in fact, the intent of voters, as explained in Part V.
In sum, analyses of the wrongful death and med mal cap statutes, the
related case law, and rules of statutory interpretation support the per-plaintiff
application of the med mal cap in wrongful deaths. This is why Judge Denton
noted in his two-paragraph order that the $350,000 cap did not apply to the
plaintiffs in the aggregate, because each of the plaintiffs has a separate cause of
152 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 29:12–30:13.
153 Mr. Kennedy represented Valley Health System, LLC, the defendant hospital system in
Villegas. See, e.g., Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10. Mr. Kennedy also represented
the defendant health system one year later in Mehanna v. Universal Health Services Founda-
tion. See Universal Health Petition, supra note 2.
154 See Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 30:12–31:08. After acknowledging to the
court that the statute’s absence of allocation guidance “could” raise some question about its
enforceability if the cap is applied per incident, Mr. Kennedy went on to argue that “if you
look carefully at the Equal Protection analysis you might come to the opposite conclusion
with some of the Equal Protection cases say[ing] you have a right to sue, you have a right to
make a claim, but there is no guarantee [as to] what recovery you’ll make, if any recovery.”
Id. at 30:42–31:08.
155 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 18.
156 Fierle v. Perez, 219 P.3d 906, 910–11 (Nev. 2009) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted) (applying the rules of statutory construction to NRS 41A.015 and NRS
41A.017, which were enacted by the same initiative petition and ballot question as NRS
41A.035, and concluding that NRS Chapters 41A and 89 “must be read in harmony.”) The
issue of legislative intent is addressed in Part V.A. of this Note.
157 Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 18–19.
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action under the wrongful death statute.158 The same analytical framework led
Judge Sturman to conclude that “in the wrongful death context, the combina-
tion of [the med mal cap statute and the wrongful death statute] yields a deter-
mination that heirs in the medical malpractice context are subject to a
compensatory damage limitation of $350,000 per person, per claim, regardless
of the number of actors.”159 And, likewise, Judge Silver held that the med mal
cap statute’s
use of the singular phrases “the injured plaintiff” and “in an action,” coupled with the
wrongful death statute’s use of the phrases “the heirs . . . may each maintain an
action,” each heir “may prove their respective damages” and the “jury may award
each person pecuniary damages,” clearly indicates each plaintiff heir in a wrongful
death case has his or her own action with his or her own recoverable damages.
. . . Here, each Plaintiff Heir is entitled to non-economic damages with a limita-
tion of $350,000 per plaintiff for any damages other than punitive damages.160
V. PLAIN LANGUAGE OR PLAINLY AMBIGUOUS?
Obviously, the dispute over the proper application of the med mal cap is
largely, if not entirely, one of statutory interpretation. The most fundamental
Supreme Court of Nevada rule for statutory interpretation is: If the plain lan-
guage of a statute is unambiguous, the proper interpretation of that statute is its
plain language meaning.161
Plaintiffs and defendants contend that the med mal cap statute is not
ambiguous and urge the plain language reading of the statute.162 As explained
in Part III of this Note, plaintiffs call for the singular nouns to be read literally,
as strictly singular. The statute could have been written using the plural if that
was what was meant, just as it could have said that the cap would now apply
per incident, if that was what was meant. They also contend that any ambiguity
that might arise from the phrase “professional negligence” in the statute is clari-
fied by the comprehensive definition of that phrase in NRS 41A.015, a statute
that was added in conjunction with the med mal cap statute and as a result of
the same voter initiative ballot question that resulted in the current med mal
statute.163 Defendants, on the other hand, argue that a plain reading of the stat-
158 Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2.
159 Neal Order, supra note 13, at 3.
160 Mehanna Order, supra note 13, at 4–5.
161 Rosequist v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 49 P.3d 651, 653 (Nev. 2002) (“If the plain
meaning of a statute is clear on its face, then [this court] will not go beyond the language of
the statute to determine its meaning.”).
162 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 12–14 (petitioners—defendants in a
lawsuit alleging fatal medical malpractice—arguing that the plain language of the med mal
cap statute states that the cap applies to multiple plaintiffs in the aggregate); Tremblay Oppo-
sition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 3–4 (plaintiffs urging for a plain language
reading of the med mal caps that the $350,000 cap is applicable to each single plaintiff’s
action); Villegas Motion To Confirm Damage Cap, supra note 25, at 4.
163 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.015 (2011) (“ ‘Professional negligence’ means a negligent act or
omission to act by a provider of health care in the rendering of professional services, which
act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death. The term does
not include services that are outside the scope of services for which the provider of health
care is licensed or services for which any restriction has been imposed by the applicable
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ute, in which action has its generally presumed common-law meaning of “law-
suit,”164 leads to the conclusion that the cap applies per incident. Turning some
of the plaintiffs’ argument on its head, defendants note that the statute could
have easily been written to use the phrase “cause of action” if that meaning had
been intended.165
The position that the statute is unambiguous, however, is highly questiona-
ble for several reasons. First, in Upchurch, the court referred to the materially
identical language of “in an action” as ambiguous,166 and the meaning of that
phrase in NRS 41.035 is key here.167 But even more fundamentally, the Nevada
Supreme Court has defined ambiguous as “susceptible to more than one natural
or honest interpretation,”168 and as “capable of being understood in two or
more senses by reasonably informed persons.”169 The med mal cap would cer-
tainly appear to meet that definition of ambiguous. Not only is the meaning of
key words in the statute, such as “action,” disputed,170 but also the meaning of
the statute, as it pertains to application of the cap, has been understood by at
least two Nevada district court judges to be the opposite of the meaning under-
stood by three other Nevada district court judges.171 By the very nature of their
positions, judges are not only presumed to be reasonably informed, they have a
duty to be reasonably informed. Moreover, their law clerks and the attorneys
who come before the courts are required to reasonably inform the judges. The
fact that several of those judges reached diametrically opposed conclusions
about the statute’s meaning evinces that the statute is susceptible to more than
one honest interpretation and capable of being understood in at least two senses
by reasonably informed persons. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
statute is ambiguous.
A. The Only Relevant Legislative Intent Here Is Voter Intent
When a statute is ambiguous Nevada courts look beyond the plain mean-
ing to the legislative intent.172 The Nevada Supreme Court, over the years, has
regulatory board or health care facility.”). This statute was “[a]dded [to NRS] by 2004 initia-
tive petition, Ballot Question No. 3.” Id.
164 See, e.g., supra Part III; see also Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 13–14.
165 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 14.
166 Cnty. of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 961 P.2d 754, 761 (Nev. 1998).
167 See supra Part III.
168 State v. Granite Constr. Co., 40 P.3d 423, 426 (Nev. 2002).
169 McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors of Carson City, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (Nev. 1986).
170 See supra Part III.
171 Compare Tremblay Order, supra note 6, at 2 (wherein Judge Denton found that the cap
applied per plaintiff, in part, he noted, because the med mal cap statute “uses the term ‘plain-
tiff’ in the singular”), and Mehanna Order, supra note 13, at 4–5 (wherein Judge Silver used
rationale similar to Denton’s in Tremblay), with Villegas Order Re: Damage Cap, supra note
5, at 2 (wherein Judge Miley found the cap applied per event regardless of the number of
plaintiffs), and Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 6 (wherein Judge Elliott found “that the lan-
guage of NRS 41A.035 and NRS 41.085 support[ed] Defendants’ argument that the non-
economic damages cap limit[ed] the recovery to $350,000 to Plaintiffs collectively”).
172 Granite Constr. Co., 40 P.3d at 426. (“When a statute is ambiguous, the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in statutory interpretation.”).
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sorted out how courts should attempt to discern intent of the Legislature,173
including adopting rules such as: “In construing an ambiguous statute, [the
court] must give the statute the interpretation that ‘reason and public policy
would indicate the legislature intended.’ ”174 Advocates of the per-lawsuit
interpretation of the med mal cap statute cite actual legislative history to sup-
port their argument.175 They ask the courts to take into account legislators’
statements and testimony from committee hearings regarding the KODIN initi-
ative, known as Initiative Petition 1 (“I.P. 1”) and proposed legislation regard-
ing med mal caps, particularly Senate Bill 97 (“S.B. 97”) and Assembly Bill 1
(“A.B.1”).176
The court should not take that legislative history into account, however.
The Nevada Legislature did not create or enact this statute; the statute was,
rather, created and enacted by voter initiative.177 The statutory initiative pro-
cess is not only different from the Legislature’s process but one that the state
constitution separates from the Legislature’s process.178
173 See, e.g., Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 179 P.3d
542, 548 (Nev. 2008) (“When a statute is ambiguous . . . or when it does not address the
issue at hand, however, we may look to reason and public policy to determine what the
Legislature intended. The import of the statutory language used may be ascertained by exam-
ining the background and spirit in which the law was enacted, and the entire subject matter
and policy guides our interpretation. Finally, we consider multiple legislative provisions as a
whole, construing a statute so that no part is rendered meaningless. Because the statute that
we are ultimately concerned with here, NRS 287.010, is ambiguous, we turn to the statute’s
historical background and spirit, reason, and public policy to guide us in our interpreta-
tion.”); Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 148 P.3d
790, 793 (Nev. 2006) (“When construing an ambiguous statute, legislative intent is control-
ling, and we look to legislative history for guidance. Finally, we consider ‘the policy and
spirit of the law and will seek to avoid an interpretation that leads to an absurd result.’ ”);
Metz v. Metz, 101 P.3d 779, 783 (Nev. 2004).
174 Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 97 P.3d
1132, 1135 (Nev. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting State, Dep’t Motor Vehicles v. Vezeris,
720 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Nev. 1986)).
175 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 21–26.
176 See, e.g., id. at 22–26; Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 1–2;
Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 23:22–25:29.
177 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2011) (“Added . . . by 2004 initiative petition, Ballot Ques-
tion No. 3”).
178 See Rogers v. Heller, 18 P.3d 1034, 1036 (Nev. 2001) (outlining the separation thusly:
“Nevada’s Constitution expressly empowers the people to propose, by initiative petition,
statutes and amendments to statutes; it requires the Secretary of State to transmit a certified
initiative petition to the Legislature as soon as the Legislature convenes. Thereafter, the
Legislature must enact or reject the proposed initiative petition without change or amend-
ment within forty days. If the Legislature fails to act within the forty days, or rejects the
initiative petition, then the Secretary of State must submit the initiative petition to the electo-
rate for a vote at the next general election. If approved, the Legislature cannot amend, annul,
repeal, set aside or suspend the law within three years after it takes effect.”) (internal cita-
tions omitted); see also id. at 1039–40 (“[I]nitiative legislation is not subject to judicial
tampering—the substance of an initiative petition should reflect the unadulterated will of the
people and should proceed, if at all, as originally proposed and signed. For this reason, our
constitution prevents the Legislature from changing or amending a proposed initiative peti-
tion that is under consideration. Like the Legislature, we are not in a position to know
whether an initiative’s drafters and signers would want an initiative to proceed without a
primary component of the proposal.”).
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The intent underlying a “direct democracy” effort such as a statutory initi-
ative is more accurately termed “popular intent” or “voter intent,”179 but no
matter what name it is given, the Nevada Supreme Court has yet to establish
rules specifically for ascertaining the intent behind initiative-created state stat-
utes. The court has dealt with discerning intent for a county statute, though, and
in that ruling the court appeared to be in favor of examining voter ballot sum-
maries and voter ballot arguments when interpreting a voter initiative.180 The
court also has outlined various ways to try to determine the intent behind a
particular type of voter-created statewide law—a provision added to the consti-
tution by initiative.
A constitutional initiative is different from a statutory initiative in at least
two ways. It is generally different in that a constitutional initiative “provides
more durability than its statutory counterpart.”181 Nevada’s constitution recog-
nizes that increased durability and uniquely requires182 that initiative-created
constitutional amendments be approved by voters at two consecutive general
elections before they are enacted.183 Statutory initiatives, on the other hand, are
enacted after being approved only once at the polls in Nevada.184 Because they
are different, it is not reasonable to presume that rules the court applies to
constitutional initiatives are equally and wholly applicable to statutory initia-
tives. Indeed, in Miller v. Burk, a case that advocates of the per-incident appli-
cation cite for their preferred approach to voter intent, the court’s choice of
words repeatedly specify that the decision is referring to a constitutional
provision.185
Burk’s approach is that “we may look to the provision’s history, public
policy, and reason to determine what the voters intended,”186 but that is only
one of several possible approaches the court has outlined for ascertaining the
voter intent behind constitutional initiatives. Another is found in Guinn v. Leg-
179 See generally, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive
Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995); see also Chris Chambers Good-
man, Examining “Voter Intent” Behind Proposition 209: Why Recruitment, Retention and
Scholarship Privileges Should Be Permissible Under Article I, Section 31, 27 CHICANA/O-
LATINA/O L. REV. 59 (2008).
180 See Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v. Jumpers, LLC, 128 P.3d 452, 461 (Nev.
2006) (wherein the court examined the argument included in the sample ballot to determine
the voter intent behind a county statutory initiative).
181 Schacter, supra note 180, at 116.
182 Nevada is the only state to have such a requirement. Nevada, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM
INST. AT THE U. OF S. CAL. (2013), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Nevada.htm.
183 NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2(4).
184 Id. § 2(3).
185 Miller v. Burk, 188 P.3d 1112, 1119–20 (Nev. 2008) (“To determine a constitutional
provision’s meaning, we turn first to the provision’s language. In so doing, we give that
language its plain effect, unless the language is ambiguous. If a constitutional provision’s
language is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to ‘two or more reasonable but incon-
sistent interpretations,’ we may look to the provision’s history, public policy, and reason to
determine what the voters intended. Conversely, when a constitutional provision’s language
is clear on its face, we will not go beyond that language in determining the voters’ intent or
to create an ambiguity when none exists. Whatever meaning ultimately is attributed to a
constitutional provision may not violate the spirit of that provision.”) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
186 Id. at 1120.
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islature of the State of Nevada,187 and the Guinn court’s approach is one that is
more reasonably and appropriately extended to ascertaining voter intent behind
statutory initiatives in general and the med mal cap question in particular. That
Guinn is the best approach in general is evident in the fact that it is by far the
most prevalently used way of discerning intent of voters who approved statu-
tory initiatives.188 It is the approach that is most appropriate for the med mal
question in particular because of the parallels between issues surrounding the
med mal cap-wrongful death question and those of the Guinn case.
In Guinn, the court discerned the meaning of a petition-created constitu-
tional amendment, the gist of which had been considered but not enacted by the
Nevada Legislature, had then gone directly to voters through the initiative pro-
cess and was approved by the voters.189 The med mal cap statute followed a
similar path,190 except it did not have to go before voters twice.191 Also at issue
in Guinn was a conflict between, and conflicting interpretations of, the consti-
tutional initiative and a pre-existing constitutional amendment,192 just as there
are conflicts between and conflicting interpretations of the med mal cap and
wrongful death statutes here.193
The Guinn court stated that when construing a constitutional amendment
that is subject to conflicting interpretations, the court looks beyond the plain
language of the provision to ascertain the intent of those who enacted the provi-
sion at issue.194 Because voters enacted the constitutional provision at issue in
Guinn, the court examined “the arguments for and against passage, presented in
the voter information and sample ballot pamphlet.”195 Examination of the offi-
cial ballot materials presented to voters is the same approach that has been
found to be the dominant way of discerning the intent of statutes created by
initiative.196 Moreover, it has long been the standard approach in California,197
187 Guinn v. Leg. of State of Nev., 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003).
188 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 180, at 120–23 (outlining various sources courts consult
to determine popular intent). Professor Schacter also notes, however, that studies show many
voters base their ballot decisions on information that they get from sources other than the
official ballot material. Id. at 111.
189 Guinn, 76 P.3d at 25–26.
190 See Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 3.
191 Compare NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2(3), with id. § 2(4).
192 Guinn, 76 P.3d at 25–26.
193 The conflict between those two statutes is explained above. See supra Part IV.
194 Guinn, 76 P.3d at 29 (“In construing the Constitution, our primary objective is to discern
the intent of those who enacted the provisions at issue, and to fashion an interpretation
consistent with that objective. However, when the enactors’ intent cannot be determined,
rules of constitutional construction require us to attempt to harmonize differing provisions so
as to give as much effect as possible to each provision. We look beyond the plain language
of constitutional provisions to ascertain intent ‘when a construction is urged which would
result in an absurd situation’ or when provisions are subject to conflicting interpretations.”)
(internal citations omitted).
195 Id. at 26 & n.10.
196 Schacter, supra note 180, at 120–23.
197 See id. at 114–15, 120–23 (in which Professor Schacter studied decisions handed down
in the decade from 1984–1994); Goodman, supra note 180, at 63–64 (noting that in Decem-
ber 2000, the California Supreme Court reviewed the ballot pamphlet materials of Proposi-
tion 209 as the guide for the court’s attempt to ascertain the voter intent for the proposition,
which was a constitutional initiative).
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a state not only known for its “heavy usage of direct lawmaking”198 but, more
importantly for the purposes of this Note, the state from which Nevada courts
most frequently draw persuasive authority for legal questions upon which
Nevada’s case law is thin.199
Therefore, because the Nevada Supreme Court used this approach to
resolve a relatively similar situation and because it is the approach to ascertain
voter intent used in California for statutory initiatives, the court should examine
the ballot materials to ascertain voter intent of statutory initiatives in Nevada.
Courts also have common sense reasons to rely mainly, if not exclusively,
on official ballot material when attempting to ascertain voter intent. While the
traditional search for legislative intent can be difficult, “[t]here are reasons to
suspect that a search for ‘popular intent’ will be even more problematic.”200
Consider, for example, the mass size of the electorate; the absence of legislative
hearings, committee reports, or other recorded legislative history; and the inability of
citizen lawmakers to deliberate about, or to amend, proposed ballot measures. In
addition, voters are not professional lawmakers, so it is problematic to impute to the
electorate the same knowledge about law, legal terminology, and legislative context
that courts routinely ascribe—if sometimes only as aspiration—to legislators. These
structural dynamics of the direct lawmaking process should further burden what is in
any circumstance a problematic quest for the single intent underlying a law.201
Therefore, the only realistically manageable way to try to discern voter intent is
by examining the ballot materials. Those materials are the only information to
which all voters unquestionably had equal access. It also is the information for
which it is most reasonable to presume accuracy because the state provides it as
the official information about the ballot question and it is subject to judicial
review.
In the case of the KODIN initiative, it would be highly unreasonable to
presume that all, or even most, voters observed or listened to the Legislature’s
discussion of Initiative Petition 1 either in person in Carson City or via live
broadcast on the Internet.202 Granted, contemporaneous newspaper articles and
minutes of legislative hearings were also available to the voting public prior to
198 See Schacter, supra note 180, at 115.
199 See KATHERINE HENDERSON & PAMELA G. ROBERTS, STATE BAR OF NEVADA, NEVADA
CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 1.03 (2012) (“California law has been a prominent source of
Nevada law since the inception of statehood.”); see also Clark v. Lubritz, 944 P.2d 861, 865
n.6 (Nev. 1997) (recognizing that “Nevada’s statute on punitive damages is a verbatim copy
of the California punitive damages statute . . . .”); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Tab
Constr., Inc., 583 P.2d 449, 451 (Nev. 1978) (wherein the court bases its holding on a ruling
of the California Supreme Court and a California appellate court’s application of the rule
established by the California Supreme Court).
200 Schacter, supra note 180, at 110.
201 Id.
202 There is no C-Span-like network that broadcasts Nevada legislative hearings on televi-
sion or on the radio, but live Internet streaming of the legislature’s committee meetings was
available in 2003. See Ed Vogel, Listen to Legislators on Internet, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar.
15, 1999, at B1 (reporting the availability of live Internet audio of committee meetings);
Sean Whaley, Legislature’s “Digital Democracy” Lauded, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 27,
2003, at B2 (reporting that live Internet video of committee meetings was available by
2003).
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the vote on the KODIN initiative,203 and given the wide reach of the mass
media being expanded by the Internet it is not unreasonable to presume that a
majority of voters might have had access to reports about at least some of the
legislative discussion about I.P. 1.
In fact, Professor Schacter found that voters rely heavily on informal
sources such as the media, to learn about initiatives. Informal sources could
give judges a more reliable picture of voters’ intent—if judges could take those
informal sources properly into account. But judges cannot, and therefore should
not.
Asking judges to wade into the domain of media coverage and advertising in search
of a singular and dispositive popular intent, however, imagines a judicial task that is
onerous and—more significantly—ultimately incoherent. This task seems doomed to
fail when measured against the goal of enabling judges to locate a single popular
intent. Judicial immersion in the unwieldy body of images, words, and political slo-
gans that may comprise the media coverage and advertising related to a ballot mea-
sure is likely to intensify, not reduce, the problems of indeterminacy that already
undermine the search for popular intent. Particularly in a high-profile campaign, the
mass of media representations is sprawling and diffuse, and it will rarely yield defini-
tive answers about the design of the voters. Consider, for example, the contemporary
phenomenon of talk radio. What could we ask judges to distill from such apparently
influential, but cacophonous, sources?
In some cases, there will be information in media sources that is relevant to the
interpretive issues before the court. When reasonably accessible, direct, and uncon-
troverted in addressing the question at issue, there are good reasons for courts to
consider such information along with other relevant factors. It is quite another thing,
however, to suppose that consulting media sources will enable judges to locate a
fixed, retrievable popular intent. It is unlikely that intent-based interpretation can find
its deliverance by recasting judges as cultural critics or political consultants and ask-
ing them to determine which stories, symbols, or sound bites most likely influenced
voters and shaped a discrete collective understanding.
In addition, assigning a central place to media sources invites strategic behavior
on the part of partisans in the initiative battle, such as attempts to fill the airwaves
and the larger public record with characterizations and claims intended to influence
subsequent judicial interpretation. In the end, this solution would create as many
problems as it would solve.204
Although questions about whether voters read and how much they under-
stand are equally valid when applied to the ballot materials, those materials
nevertheless constitute the official information that the state provided its voters,
and therefore those materials are the best, most reliable, and reasonable place to
look for voter intent. The Secretary of State had the official duty of informing
voters, through the ballot materials, as to what the amendment to the law meant
and what effect it would have.205 The Secretary of State also is required to be
203 After transcription, minutes for Nevada Legislature committee hearings were available
in 2003 and 2004, as they are now, on the Nevada Legislature web site, http://www.leg.state.
nv.us. Examples of the media coverage include Ed Vogel, Doctors Have Backup Plan, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 19, 2003, at B5; Sean Whaley & Ed Vogel, Lawmakers Set Fast Pace
Halfway Through Session, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 23, 2003, at B1; see also Jan Gilbert,
Your Turn Jan Gilbert, RENO GAZ.-J., May 30, 2003, at A13.
204 Schacter, supra note 180, at 144–45 (internal citations omitted).
205 NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.250(5) (2011).
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accurate and informative in explaining the legal consequences of an initia-
tive.206 And, as the Jones v. Heller writ of mandamus proves, the Secretary of
State’s fulfillment of those duties is subject to judicial review.207 Under NRS
293.250(5), the Secretary of State must prepare for voters a condensation and
explanation of a ballot question, and that condensation and explanation must be
“in easily understood language and of reasonable length.”208 The statutory pro-
vision contains no express standards regarding what must be in the condensa-
tion and explanation. The court has said that while it recognizes that it might be
impossible to include all possible ramifications of a measure, the explanation
should not omit pertinent information so as to become misleading.209
Here, the ballot material that the Secretary of State provided to voters did
not tell voters that the new med mal cap would apply per incident or that in a
case with multiple plaintiffs one cap would have to be split among the plain-
tiffs.210 Indeed, in their argument to the Nevada Supreme Court, the respon-
dents/defendants in Villegas conceded that “the voter ballot is silent as to
whether the cap on non-economic damages applies on a per-plaintiff, per-
defendant basis or on a per-action/per-event basis.”211
B. The Phrase That Was Removed
The advocates of the per-plaintiff application of the cap argue that the
ballot material did not need to spell out that change for voters because voters
had constructive notice by virtue of the new statute’s elimination of the phrase
“to each plaintiff from each defendant.”212 They argue the removal of that
phrase demonstrated to voters that the new statute was intended to apply to
plaintiffs in the aggregate and that voters thereby knowingly chose cap dam-
ages on a per-event basis.213 The argument here is based on the California
Supreme Court ruling that generally when legislation is enacted by initiative,
voters are “deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in
effect at the time legislation is enacted,”214 and on a California Court of Appeal
decision that says “[b]oth the Legislature and the electorate by the initiative
process are deemed to be aware of laws in effect at the time they enact new
laws and are conclusively presumed to have enacted the new laws in light of
existing laws having direct bearing upon them.”215
206 Nev. Judges Ass’n v. Lau, 910 P.2d 898, 903–04 (Nev. 1996).
207 See generally Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Jones v. Heller,
No. 43940 (Nev. Sept. 18, 2004) (unpublished order) [hereinafter Jones Order]; see also
supra Part V.A.
208 Nevada Judges Ass’n, 910 P.2d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209 Id.
210 See DEAN HELLER, SEC’Y OF STATE OF NEV., NEVADA STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS
2004: TO APPEAR ON THE NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT 14–22, available
at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/2004.pdf.
211 Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 8.
212 Id. at 9–12.
213 Id. at 10–12.
214 People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380, 384 (Cal. 1985).
215 Williams v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 275 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citation
omitted).
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Those California decisions may be persuasive authority, but they are not
mandatory authority. Moreover, the same rules could be used to argue in favor
of the per-plaintiff interpretation: If voters are deemed to have been aware of
existing laws and judicial construction at the time they approved the med mal
cap, then they were aware of the existing wrongful death statute and the judicial
construction that made “in an action” a term of art meaning “cause of action” in
the damages cap/wrongful death context.216
Yet another statutory interpretation rule is expressed broadly and generally
as: The court presumes that the enactor of a statute is aware of other similar or
related statutes. But the court has only applied that presumption where the
enactor of a statute has been the Nevada Legislature.217 The Nevada Supreme
Court has not expressly extended that presumption to voter initiatives in which
voters effectively “enact” a statute at the polls, and several reasons can be cited
to show that it would not be reasonable to extend that critical presumption to
the electorate. The electorate, after all, is an exponentially larger and more
diverse group than the legislature, and as a result presumptions about what the
majority of voters know face a far greater risk of being inaccurate than do
presumptions about what the legislature knows. Additionally, unlike voters,
legislators swear an oath to perform their duties faithfully and well,218 and it is
reasonable to consider awareness of similar or related statutes to be inherent in
the performance of legislative duties faithfully and well. Moreover, the legisla-
ture has a staff that is paid, at least in part, to ensure legislators are kept aware
of similar or related statutes.219 For these reasons, it is reasonable to apply this
presumption of awareness to the legislature. But the electorate has not sworn
any oath, has no official legislative “duty” per se, and has no staff tasked with
keeping it aware of statutes that are similar or related to statutes proposed by
ballot questions. Therefore, it is not reasonable to apply this presumption to the
electorate.
Professor Schacter put it this way:
There is no basis in the literature about initiative campaigns—or in intuitions about
elections and voters more generally—to believe that voters have any detailed knowl-
edge about the legal context surrounding the proposed initiative. One can see the case
for expecting legislative drafters to be aware of such things as related and prior law,
judicial interpretations of similar language, and relevant interpretive canons that
reviewing courts may apply. Whether all legislators do, in fact, have this knowledge
may be another matter, but given the staff, legislative analyses, and other resources
available to professional lawmakers, it is reasonable enough to expect them to know
something about the “legal landscape” into which a new law will fit. Because this is
216 See supra Part III.
217 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 215 P.3d 697, 702 (Nev.
2009); Cable v. State ex rel. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 127 P.3d 528, 531 (Nev. 2006).
218 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 282.020 (2011).
219 See LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, NEVADA LEGISLATURE, http://leg.state.nv.us/Divi-
sion/LCB/morelcb.cfm (last visited May 16, 2013) (“The staff services of the Legislative
Counsel Bureau are furnished throughout the year for any legislator. Legal advice, fiscal
information, and background research are furnished upon request. Services of a more exten-
sive nature are executed when the Legislature so orders by means of a law or resolution.
Between sessions, such projects may be requested through the Legislative Commission.”).
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not the case with ordinary voters, many of the legal consequences of new initiative
laws are systematically unforeseeable to citizen-legislators.220
A layman’s explanation for deleting the “to each plaintiff from each
defendant” language from Nevada’s old med mal statute could be that the lan-
guage would have been redundant and therefore unnecessary in the new statute
because the intentionally restrictive singular use of the nouns in the new statute
and the use of “an action,” meaning “a cause of action” or “claim,” conveyed
the same meaning as “to each plaintiff from each defendant” did in the old
statute.
And while the material that the Secretary of State presented to voters is
silent as to per-event application of the cap, that ballot material can easily be
read as loud and clear as to the per-plaintiff application because the ballot
material also uses the singular when explaining to whom a $350,000 cap would
apply. The final version of the condensation of the KODIN initiative states that
it would “limit the amount of noneconomic damages a person may recover
from a negligent provider of health care in medical malpractice actions.”221
The “Argument In Support of Question 3” which accompanied the KODIN
initiative notably used the singular “plaintiff” when it told Nevada voters that
“KODIN sets a $350,000 limit on the amount a medical malpractice plaintiff
can recover for noneconomic damages, like ‘pain and suffering.’ ”222
Moreover, the condensation and explanation prepared by the Secretary of
State and upon which voters ultimately cast their ballots was, in fact, one that
that had been revised at the direction of the Nevada Supreme Court.223
VI. A DE FACTO DETERMINATION BY THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT
The initial ballot information prepared by the Secretary of State for Ballot
Question 3 was challenged in Jones v. Heller.224 Petitioners for a writ of man-
damus asserted “that the condensation and explanation [did] not adequately,
fairly and sufficiently describe the initiative and its ramifications, that the argu-
ment and rebuttal in support of the initiative contain[ed] factual inaccuracies
and misleading statements that the Secretary [of State] should have
rejected.”225 A plurality of the court told the Secretary of State that the conden-
sation and explanation were facially deficient and that he had to rewrite it to
explain what changes the new cap would make to existing Nevada law.226 A
credible argument can be made that the justices found the only change in the
application of the cap made by the new statute was the elimination of the two
exceptions to the cap. The order stated that “[n]either the condensation nor the
explanation accurately reflects that, if passed, the initiative would simply
remove the two statutory exceptions to the existing $350,000 cap.”227
220 Schacter, supra note 180, at 127–28 (internal citations omitted).
221 HELLER, supra note 211, at 14 (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
223 Jones Order, supra note 208, at 6.
224 Id. at 1.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1–2, 6.
227 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ312.txt unknown Seq: 32 17-JUN-13 10:37
1014 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:983
Although that statement is in the opinion signed by only three of the jus-
tices, two additional justices concurred specifically with the “decision to direct
the Secretary of State to either correct the inaccuracies in his condensation and
explanation or remove Question 3 from the ballot.”228 And a sixth justice who
concurred in part and agreed “that the Secretary of State ought to be required to
revise the explanation that accompanies the KODIN initiative ballot question
because, as written, it is deficient. It must, even at this late date, be changed so
that it is accurate, impartial and disinterested.”229 Even the lone justice who did
not partially concur noted that he agreed that the condensation and explanation
was deficient and should be clarified; he dissented because he believed there
was insufficient time to do it properly.230 He wanted to deny the petition
because he believed any relief would “seriously disrupt the process of printing
and mailing election ballots to Nevada voters.”231
Notably, none of the opinions states that another deficiency of the conden-
sation and explanation was that the Secretary of State had also failed to point
out that another change the initiative would make to the med mal cap would be
to apply it per incident.232 The logical inference here is that unless the justices
significantly botched their review and/or writing of their order, the plurality did
not see the removal of the per-plaintiff language as changing the cap to a per-
incident application. If the justices had understood the new statute to be chang-
ing the cap applicability from per plaintiff to per event, they could have, and
presumably would have, in the Jones v. Heller order, also required the Secre-
tary of State to make that change clear to voters in the condensation. But the
justices did not require the Secretary of State to do so.
It would particularly make sense that the court viewed the new statute as
retaining the per-plaintiff application of the cap if they were reading “in an
action” to mean cause of action, and reading the singular nouns throughout the
new statutory language for the cap as singular. In that context, the additional
“per-plaintiff” language in the old statute would be redundant and unnecessary
and could be removed without effecting a change in the corresponding meaning
of the statute.
What to make of Jones v. Heller, is further complicated by its classifica-
tion as an unpublished order.233 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 123 (NSC 123)
says:
An unpublished opinion or order of the Nevada Supreme Court shall not be regarded
as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority except when the opinion or
order is (1) relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata or collateral
estoppel; (2) relevant to a criminal or disciplinary proceeding because it affects the
same defendant or respondent in another such proceeding; or (3) relevant to an analy-
sis of whether recommended discipline is consistent with previous discipline orders
appearing in the state bar publication.234
228 Id. at 1 (Shearing, C.J., & Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229 Id. at 1 (Agosti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230 Id. at 1 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
231 Id.
232 See generally id. (plurality opinion, concurrences and dissents).
233 Jones v. Heller, 131 P.3d 615 (Nev. 2004).
234 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123.
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The latter two exceptions to the rule are inapplicable here because the question
of proper application of the cap is neither relevant to a criminal or disciplinary
proceeding nor relevant to an analysis of recommended discipline. An argu-
ment can be made, however, that the Jones v. Heller order is “relevant under
the doctrines of law of the case.” Justice Agosti, in her partial concurrence and
partial dissent, and Justice Maupin, in his dissent, each note that the ballot
measure itself addressed “some of the most difficult and complex legal doc-
trines” in the law.235
When the Villegas petitioners brought the cap question before the Nevada
Supreme Court and cited to the unpublished Jones v. Heller order they did not,
in either their petition236 or in their oral argument,237 claim any exception to
the rule against unpublished orders. In the past the court has come down rela-
tively hard on briefs that cite unpublished orders of the court as authority, not-
ing that such a citation makes the brief “deficient.”238 But in Villegas the
justices did not shut down the petitioners’ use of the order or otherwise speak to
the fact that it is an unpublished order239 even after counsel for the respondents
highlighted that the order is unpublished and cited to NSC 123.240
In considering whether the court should take Jones v. Heller into account,
and if so, to what degree, it is worth keeping in mind not only the general
rationale behind the rule that unpublished court product has no precedential
value but also the limit of the limitation itself.
Generally, unpublished decisions or opinions have no precedential value other than
the persuasiveness of their reasoning, as an opinion that is not published is written
primarily for the parties who are already knowledgeable of the facts of the particular
case, and for this reason, most unpublished decisions do not contain a comprehensive
analysis of the legal issues decided by the court.241
Courts use their ability to declare an order, decision, or opinion as “unpub-
lished”242 for a variety of reasons,243 but one of the general notions as to why
“unpublished” court documents should not be precedential is that too often
such documents have been “rather hastily prepared, by law clerks or staff attor-
235 Jones Order, supra note 208, at 1 n.1 (Agosti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 1 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
236 Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 3, 18–19.
237 See generally Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10.
238 Nev. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t v. Weber, 676 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Nev. 1984).
239 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10.
240 Id. at 18:29–18:52.
241 Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 105 A.L.R.5th 499,
511 (2003).
242 They may be declared “unpublished” by the court and withheld from official court
reporters, but in today’s world of electronic databases, many, if not most, “unpublished”
court documents are, in fact, “published” and widely available online. See Martha Dragich
Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions As Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1290
(2004) (“Many unpublished opinions are available online, both in commercial databases and
on the courts of appeals’ own web sites.”).
243 See generally id. at 1235–37. In the Jones v. Heller order, the Nevada Supreme Court
did not explain why it had decided not to publish the order. See generally Jones Order, supra
note 208.
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neys, with little oversight by judges, and without attention to careful wording or
possible future implications.”244
The Jones v. Heller order was undoubtedly hastily prepared; the plurality
opinion notes that the court was dealing with an “emergency”245 and the first
sentence of Justice Maupin’s dissent complains that “the petitioners and the
Secretary [of State] have left us with insufficient time to craft a remedy that
adequately addresses the deficiencies” of the Question 3 ballot material.246 But
the court heard the case en banc, noted the importance of the matter by writing
four opinions spanning fifteen pages, and showed the importance the court was
according the case by fast-tracking it. This was, after all, a high-profile case as
it involved a decision that had the potential to prevent Nevada’s voters from
getting to cast their ballots on a long awaited and hotly debated initiative or at
the very least force elections officials to scramble to rewrite and reprint state-
wide ballot materials. The Nevada Secretary of State was the respondent in the
case. The words used in the four opinions and the way the court handled the
petition indicate the court did not take the matter lightly and tried to do every-
thing it could under the circumstances to avoid giving short shrift to such a
high-profile case. In sum, other than the fact that it was fast-tracked, it is hard
to say definitively that the Jones v. Heller order is the kind of court product that
fits under the usual reasons for classifying court product as unpublished. It is
more reasonable to consider the Jones v. Heller order as one for which the
justices made every possible effort to craft well-reasoned and sound opinions.
Even if the order was not relevant under the doctrines of law of Villegas v.
Eighth Judicial District Court, and therefore is not precedential, the order
should still be considered as persuasive authority. At the very least, the order
documents what several of the justices identified as the change to the cap pro-
posed by Ballot Question 3. Therefore, at least one portion of the order goes
directly to the heart of the question here and must be taken into account. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that an unpublished, non-precedential
opinion should be regarded by the court for what it is worth, as the opinion of
members of the court in a particular case.247 Here, the order also appears to be
the opinion of members of the court regarding a question that must be answered
to enable the court to answer the larger question of how the cap should be
applied.
The Nevada Supreme Court itself has recognized the importance and
potential usefulness of the court’s unpublished orders, having made unpub-
lished orders available to the public on the court’s website since 2008.248 When
the court announced that it was, in effect, publishing its unpublished orders, it
stated:
[M]any lawyers believe that there is value in looking at the unpublished orders
because they also indicate the legal thinking and positions of the Supreme Court
244 Pearson, supra note 243, at 1302.
245 Jones Order, supra note 208, at 5.
246 Id. at 1 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
247 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2006).
248 Nevada Supreme Court’s Unpublished Decisions Now Posted on Its Website, NEV. SUP.
CT. (Sept. 17, 2008, 1:37 PM), http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/archivedarticlelist/
282-nevada-supreme-courts-unpublished-decisions-now-posted-on-its-website.
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justices. The justices have long agreed, but technical limitations of the Supreme
Court website have prevented the orders from being posted in the same fashion that
the published opinions have been for years.249
Then-Chief Justice Mark Gibbons added that the court believed that ready
access to the unpublished opinions via the website would be “a valuable tool
for attorneys.”250
Because unpublished orders can “indicate the legal thinking and positions
of the Supreme Court justices,”251 they can be valuable tools not just to attor-
neys but to the justices themselves. Not all unpublished orders are created
equal, of course. Circumstances can make the argument for using a particular
unpublished order stronger, when the justices are essentially reconsidering the
same question or a question very similar to the one they had considered previ-
ously. When a court is dealing with a matter of first impression, an unpublished
opinion that spoke to the question before the court is obviously more worthy of
consideration because of its potential to aid the court,252 and that would seem
to hold even more true when the unpublished court product had been generated
by the very court before which the matter of first impression is subsequently
under consideration. A court’s decision about reliance on an unpublished order
should be based more on whether the order dealt with an analogous case and
whether the order’s “reasoning is sound and persuasive” than on the order’s
classification as unpublished.253 While many other courts share Nevada’s
approach that unpublished court product is not binding, many of those still treat
unpublished court product, even from other jurisdictions, as persuasive
authority.254
The respondents in Villegas argued that the Jones v. Heller order was not
a definitive ruling on the meaning of the cap or how it should be applied.255
The unpublished order, they argued, “doesn’t stand for anything;”256 it simply
told the Secretary of State that he and his staff had not done a very good job of
putting the ballot information together and that they needed to rewrite some of
the information.257
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4TH CIR. LOC. R. 36(b); cf. Allen v. Greenville Hotel Partners,
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 n.2 (D.S.C. 2006) (citation of unpublished opinion was war-
ranted where there was no published opinion on point).
253 Lindstrom v. AC Prods. Liab. Trust, 264 F. Supp. 2d 583, 587–88 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(“When the facts of an unpublished decision are similar to the case at hand and the reasoning
is sound and persuasive, citation to and reliance on the unpublished opinion is appropriate.”);
accord Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(opinion modified on denial of rehearing) (Unpublished opinions may have some weight;
“[s]ound opinions are the heart of the common law tradition and deserve respect.”).
254 See, e.g., Washington v. Cal. City Corr. Ctr., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 n.3 (E.D. Cal.
2012). (District court “may cite unpublished California appellate decisions as persuasive
authority.”); Aleman v. AirTouch Cellular, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849, 862 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (“Although not binding, unpublished federal district court cases are citable as persua-
sive authority.”).
255 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 19:01–19:52.
256 Id.
257 See Jones Order, supra note 208, at 4.
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But the court did more than that. The court ordered the Secretary of State
to “revise the condensation and explanation of ballot Question 3 so that they
accurately reflect the proposed changes to Nevada law.”258 So even setting
aside the point that none of the justices in Jones v. Heller pointed out that the
new statute would change Nevada law to a per-incident application of the cap,
based on their order to the Secretary of State, if he had understood the new
statute to be making that change, then he was under orders from the Nevada
Supreme Court to point that out in his revised condensation and explanation.
But he did not.
The upshot of the Jones v. Heller order was that the revised condensation
wound up telling voters that “[t]he proposal, if passed, would remove the two
statutory exceptions to the existing $350,000 cap, and limit the recovery of
noneconomic damages to $350,000 per action.”259
In conclusion, though the Jones v. Heller order is unpublished, it may
qualify for one of the exceptions to NSC 123 and could thereby have some
precedential value. Even if the order does not qualify for the exception, the
decision is persuasive authority on several points, all of which point to a con-
clusion that the per-plaintiff application of the cap is the correct one.
VII. THE CALIFORNIA COMPARISON(S)
During the Villegas oral argument, Nevada’s chief justice at the time,
Michael Douglas, observed to Mr. Kennedy, the counsel for the respondent/
defendants, that in looking at the wrongful death statute “as it relates back to”
the med mal cap statute,
[W]e have language problems, as usual, with our statutes in the State of Nevada
because in the sub[section] 2 it talks about “may each maintain an action” . . . and
then in sub[section] 4 talks about claims for damages. And then we get to [the med
mal cap statute] which talks about “an action.” So how do we corral these wonderful
terms of art so they make sense?260
Mr. Kennedy suggested that the court follow the example of the California
appellate court that looked to “the legislative intent” for an answer when it was
trying to determine the applicability of that state’s medical malpractice cap in
the wrongful death context in Yates v. Pollock.261
Nevada often looks to the more bountiful caselaw of its older and more
populous sister state California for guidance,262 and proponents of the per-law-
258 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
259 HELLER, supra note 211, at 14.
260 Villegas Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 31:14–31:59.
261 Id. at 32:07–32:39.
262 See 1 STATE BAR OF NEV., NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 1.03 (2012) (“Califor-
nia law has been a prominent source of Nevada law since the inception of statehood.”); see,
e.g., Clark v. Lubritz, 944 P.2d 861, 865 n.6 (Nev. 1997) (recognizing that “Nevada’s statute
on punitive damages is a verbatim copy of the California punitive damages statute”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Tab Constr., Inc., 583 P.2d 449,
451 (Nev. 1978) (wherein the court bases its holding on a ruling of the California Supreme
Court and a California appellate court’s application of the rule established by the California
Supreme Court); Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 502 P.2d 111, 112 (Nev. 1972) (wherein
the Nevada Supreme Court chose to adopt the reasoning of the California Supreme Court on
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suit interpretation point to California statutory and case law to support their
argument.263 They argue that looking west is particularly appropriate here
because Nevada’s med mal cap statute was modeled on California’s Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).264 Robert W. Shreck, lobbyist for
and president of the Nevada State Medical Association, testified to the Nevada
Senate Committee on Judiciary in 2003 that the initiative was so modeled,265
and contemporaneous newspaper articles portrayed the initiative as an attempt
to copy California’s statute.266 When the Villegas case went to the Nevada
Supreme Court in 2010, KODIN itself told the court that its initiative was
Nevada’s version of MICRA.267 The MICRA pedigree is a key point for the
proponents of the per-incident application of the cap because California has
applied its cap per incident to plaintiffs in the aggregate in wrongful death
cases since at least 1987.268 In fact, if MICRA had been so construed by the
California Supreme Court instead of a California appellate court, advocates of
the per-incident application in Nevada would have had a long-standing rule of
statutory construction weighing heavily in their favor: “when a statute is
derived from a sister state, it is presumably adopted with the construction given
it by the highest court of the sister state.”269
But does the sister state rule at least make California’s application of its
cap a little more persuasive than it would be otherwise? The Nevada Supreme
Court has applied the sister state presumption where the two statutes in ques-
tion were identical or nearly identical.270 Here, the two medical malpractice cap
the same points presented in Parker even though California’s reasoning was contrary to the
view that had been taken by the Nevada district court).
263 See, e.g., Universal Health Petition, supra note 2, at 20, 26–27; Sieben Order, supra
note 4, at 5.
264 Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 11; see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2 (West 2012) (California’s med mal statute).
265 See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 97 and I.P.1 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2003 Leg.,
72d Sess. 3, 6 (Nev. 2003) (statement of Robert W. Shreck, Pres., Nev. State Med. Ass’n)
(“The language in I.P. 1 has been in place in other states. It has worked well to control
insurance costs and it has been declared constitutional in California.”).
266 See, e.g., Paul Harasim, Brown Tells Nevadans: Don’t Follow California, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Oct. 29, 2004, at B1. (“[T]he Medical Injury Compensation Act . . . is now the
model for the Keep Our Doctors In Nevada initiative on the Nov. 2 ballot.”).
267 Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Keep Our Doctors In Nevada (“KODIN”) and Others
Supporting Real Parties in Interest Seeking Denial of the Petition at 3, Villegas v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 55825 (Nev. Aug. 2, 2010) (The KODIN
initiative was “modeled on the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (‘MICRA’),
adopted in California. . . .”).
268 Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that only one
action can be brought for wrongful death by multiple plaintiffs, thereby preventing multiple
actions by individual heirs and the decedent’s personal representative, holding that the “plain
language [of MICRA] unequivocably manifests a desire to place a $250,000 cap on awards
for noneconomic damages in all medical malpractice litigation, whether recovery is sought
by patients who have themselves suffered personal injuries or by the survivors of such vic-
tims who initiate suits for wrongful death.”).
269 Craigo v. Circus-Circus Enters., Inc, 786 P.2d 22, 23 (Nev. 1990) (emphasis added).
270 See id. (applying the presumption because “Nevada’s statute on punitive damages is a
verbatim copy of the California punitive damages statute”); Gilloon v. Humana, Inc., 687
P.2d 80, 81 (Nev. 1984) (applying the presumption because “the California medical malprac-
tice statute of limitations . . . in relevant part is nearly identical to ours”). See also Harvey v.
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statutes are obviously not identical. They are worded differently, the California
statute is much longer than the Nevada statute,271 and one major difference
between the two statutes is the dollar amount of the cap is forty percent higher
in Nevada’s statute. But other than the cap amount, are there so many material
differences or such significant material differences as to prevent the two stat-
utes from being “nearly identical”? At least one Nevada trial judge did not
think so. Second Judicial District Court Judge Elliott found the language of the
two states’ statutes “very similar, if not identical in the relevant parts. Both
refer to the plaintiff in the singular.”272 He noted that while the California inter-
pretation was only persuasive, not binding, he did find the reasoning and argu-
ment of the California interpretation to be directly applicable to the case he had
before him, wherein multiple heirs were seeking to have the cap applied per
plaintiff.273
The relevant portions of the California statute provide that:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional
negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement
and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed
two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
(c) For the purposes of this section:
. . .
(2) “Professional negligence” means a negligent act or omission to act by a
health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission
is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such
services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which
are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed
hospital.274
So, as Judge Elliott noted, like Nevada does in its statute, California uses
the singular nouns “action,” “the injured plaintiff,” and “negligent act or omis-
sion,” and the use of the singular did not stop California from applying the cap
to wrongful death plaintiffs in the aggregate.275
But the Yates decision gives absolutely no credence to the use of the sin-
gular and does not expressly explain why. Instead, the Yates court appears
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 32 P.3d 1263, 1268 (Nev. 2001) (applying the presumption in a
constitutional case where “Nevada’s [constitutional] draft mirrored California’s language”).
271 California’s statute uses fifty-five words to describe the cap alone then goes on for
another 163 words to provide definitions of “health care provider” and “professional negli-
gence” that are specific to the statute. The entirety of Nevada’s med mal cap statute, on the
other hand, is thirty-nine words. The same chapter of the Nevada Revised Statutes that con-
tains the med mal cap also includes two other statutes, also as a result of Ballot Question 3,
which define professional negligence (NRS § 41A.015) and “provider of health care” (NRS
§ 41A.017). The chapter’s definition of professional negligence is nearly identical to the
definition in the California med mal cap statute, but Nevada’s definition of health care pro-
vider is very differently worded than California’s. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.015
(2009), and NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.017 (2009), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
2012).
272 Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 5.
273 Id.
274 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2.
275 See Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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focused on the connection of the cap to the word “action” and on the legislative
history of the statute.276 The sentence structure of Nevada’s med mal cap, on
the other hand, directly connects the singular “injured plaintiff” to recovery of
the cap amount: “the injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic damages, but
the amount of noneconomic damages awarded in such an action must not
exceed $350,000.”277 The comparable portion of California’s statute, on the
other hand, directly connects the “action” and the cap: “In no action shall the
amount of damage for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000.)”278
But there are additional and even more significant reasons why the analyt-
ical framework of Yates is not a good fit for Nevada. California has not defined
“action” as “cause of action” in the damages cap/wrongful death context the
way Nevada has through its caselaw.279 Additionally California’s per-incident
application in Yates was based in large part on the fact that in California, “only
one action [can] be brought for the wrongful death of a person thereby prevent-
ing multiple actions by individual heirs and the personal representative.”280
[Because] the cause of action for wrongful death has been consistently characterized
as “a joint one, a single one and an indivisible one[,]” we can but conclude its use of
the word “action” in section 3333.2 represents [the California Legislature’s] con-
scious decision to limit the total recovery for noneconomic loss in such suits to
$250,000.281
In other words, California has a “one-action rule” under which the cause of
action for wrongful death is joint, single, and indivisible.282 Nevada, on the
other hand, does not have a one-action rule for wrongful death.283 Additionally,
California has not interpreted “action” to mean “cause of action” in the context
that Nevada has.284 On its face, Nevada’s wrongful death statute provides for at
276 Id.; but see Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231, 239–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (find-
ing that the language of the Cal. Civ. Code section 3333.2 supported the Atkins court’s
conclusion that California’s med mal cap applied separately to independent claims within
one lawsuit because “[t]he statute focuses on the ‘injured plaintiff’ who is entitled to recover
noneconomic losses in an amount not to exceed $250,000. Nothing in the statute limits the
defendant’s liability to that amount. Had the legislature intended to limit the defendant’s
liability encompassing all legal proceedings arising from a single act of professional negli-
gence to $250,000, it would have included the language ‘single act of negligence’ to accom-
plish this purpose. . . . [T]he statute does not limit noneconomic damages to ‘a single injury-
causing incident.’ Rather, recovery is limited for the discrete injury to each spouse because
damages flow from injury, not negligent acts.”).
277 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2009) (emphasis added).
278 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2.
279 See infra Part VII.
280 Yates, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281 Id.
282 66 CAL. JUR. 3D Wrongful Death § 10 (2013).
283 See, e.g., Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 6; see also 1
STATE BAR OF NEV., NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 5.06 (“A wrongful death action
brought by the heirs may, but need not, be joined to the action brought by the estate. NRS
41.085(3). Because the claims of the heirs and the estate are separate causes of action, they
should be subject to permissive joinder, see NRCP 20, as opposed to mandatory joinder, see
NRCP 19; see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 296–300 (3d Cir. 1980).”).
284 See infra Part III.
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least two actions in a wrongful death—one by the heirs and one by the personal
representative of the estate.285
In general, the California appellate court came to its conclusion because
California’s relevant law and statute are, in this context, materially different
from Nevada’s.286 Because California’s statutory scheme and caselaw pertain-
ing to wrongful death are different from Nevada’s and because California’s
construction of its cap statute did not come from California’s highest court,
even if Nevada’s med mal cap does have a California pedigree, California does
not provide the answer to the question of how Nevada’s cap should be applied.
It is also worth noting that three years after Yates a different California
Court of Appeal, held in Atkins v. Strayhorn that the state’s med mal cap did
not bar a separate recovery by a spouse for loss of consortium.287 The wife’s
loss of consortium claim was part of a lawsuit in which her husband was suing
for medical malpractice damages. The court distinguished between causes of
action for wrongful death and those for loss of consortium, noting that wrong-
ful death is a statutory claim while loss of consortium is a common law claim
“separate and independent” of a spouse’s claim for personal injury. The court
also observed that “[h]ad the legislature intended to limit the defendant’s liabil-
ity encompassing all legal proceedings arising from a single act of professional
negligence to $250,000, it would have included the language ‘single act of neg-
ligence’ to accomplish this purpose.”288 Because that language was not in the
statute, the court held that the purpose of the cap is to limit recovery for the
injury to each spouse because “damages flow from injury, not negligent
acts.”289
Although Atkins distinguished Yates because of the different theories of
recovery and set wrongful death claims under California statutory law aside as
a separate matter, Atkins nonetheless makes some general observations that the
Nevada court should consider if it is going be guided by California law as to
how the cap should be applied. To date, the Nevada Supreme Court has not had
an opportunity to fully consider Atkins judging from the Villegas oral argu-
ment, and the petitions and briefs filed with the court. Among the relevant
points of Atkins was the California appellate court’s finding that each injured
plaintiff in a lawsuit could recover up to the cap under MICRA, albeit not for
claims under California’s wrongful death law.290 Also, the Atkins court noted
that MICRA focused on “the injured plaintiff” and his entitlement to recover
285 See, e.g., Tremblay Opposition to Summary Judgment, supra note 25, at 4; Sieben
Order, supra note 4, at 4–5 (agreeing with defendants’ argument that the wrongful death
statute allows only two separate actions: one brought by the heirs of the decedent collec-
tively and one brought by the personal representative of the estate); Villegas Oral Argument,
supra note 10, at 33:57–34:39 (attorney Dan Polsenberg arguing on behalf of respondent Dr.
Shiekh, defendant in the underlying case); see also supra notes 129–30 and accompanying
text.
286 See infra notes 288–97 and accompanying text; see also Villegas Reply in Support,
supra note 86, at 20; Villegas Mandamus Petition, supra note 7, at 17 n.5.
287 See Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
288 Id. at 240.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 239–40.
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damages up to the cap amount, but the statute did not limit a defendant’s liabil-
ity to the cap amount.291
Additionally, if the Nevada court wants or needs to examine other states’
rulings to inform its consideration of the specific question presented here, it
certainly should not limit itself to California and its appellate courts. It should
consider, for example, Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost Professional Associa-
tion.292 In that case, the South Dakota Supreme Court was trying to answer a
question very similar to the one that this Note is examining: Does a statutory
cap on damages in an action for injury or death against a provider of health care
based upon professional negligence apply separately to each cause of action,
and specifically to wrongful death causes of action?293 The South Dakota court
considered the applicability of South Dakota Codified Laws § 21-3-11, which
at the time of Sander provided, in language similar to that of the Nevada stat-
ute, that “[i]n any action for damages for personal injury or death alleging
medical malpractice” total damages could not exceed $1 million.294 The court
held that, in the context of a wrongful death suit with multiple beneficiaries,
each statutory beneficiary had a separate cause of action for wrongful death for
purposes of determining the amount of South Dakota’s damages cap for medi-
cal malpractice actions.295
VIII. PRACTICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Another main argument used against the per-plaintiff application of the
cap is that such an application runs counter to the intent of the cap and counter
to the practical and public policy purposes of the cap.296 Judge Elliott cited
practical and policy implications as reasons for ruling against per-plaintiff
application.297 He found that “the intent of the damages cap would be frustrated
if an indefinite number of individual plaintiffs could each recover up to the
capped maximum.”298 In Villegas v. Eighth Judicial District Court, the respon-
dents/defendants complained to the Nevada Supreme Court that “[u]nder the
Villegas Estate and Heirs’ reading of the statute, jury awards for noneconomic
damages could still be in the millions of dollars, depending on the number of
plaintiffs, defendants, and claims included in a lawsuit.”299 Preventing that kind
of outcome was the very reason KODIN lobbied for the initial legislative mea-
sures aimed at overhauling the predecessor med mal cap statute, the defendants
argued.300 A per-plaintiff interpretation of NRS 41A.035 would thwart the very
purpose of the statute, they emphasized.301
291 Id. at 240.
292 Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost Prof’l Ass’n, 506 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 1993).
293 Id. at 126.
294 Id. at 126–27 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (1985)) (some emphasis added).
295 Id. at 127.
296 E.g., Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 15.
297 Sieben Order, supra note 4, at 5.
298 Id.
299 Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 15.
300 Id. at 10, 15.
301 Id. at 10–11, 15.
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This argument appears flawed for several reasons. First, the public policy
of limiting noneconomic damages for the ostensible purpose of improving
access to health care could still be served, albeit perhaps to a lesser degree, by a
cap that applies on a per-person, per-claim basis because noneconomic dam-
ages would still be limited to a fixed, pre-determined amount per cause of
action. The now-removed exceptions of the predecessor statute, on the other
hand, allowed for unlimited recoveries of noneconomic damages in cases that
qualified for the exceptions. That possibility is eliminated under the current
statute even when the cap is applied per plaintiff. The public policy of securing
what voters apparently believed to be appropriate compensation for
noneconomic harm suffered by “the injured plaintiff” would also be served by a
per-plaintiff interpretation. The Florida Supreme Court saw it similarly when it
found that a per-plaintiff cap, rather than a per-incident cap, would best satisfy
the public policies of improving the predictability of claims and securing ade-
quate compensation for injured people.302 And the California appellate court in
Atkins concluded that applying a med mal cap per plaintiff instead of per inci-
dent did not defeat the goal of the cap because ensuring “the availability of
health care and the enforceability of judgments against health care providers by
making medical malpractice insurance affordable” could still be realized in the
limitation of the amount of damages for each injured plaintiff, thus precluding
“the unknown possibility of phenomenal awards for pain and suffering that can
make litigation worth the gamble.”303
Furthermore, in a footnote, the Atkins court said that it could envision a
single act by a health care provider that negligently caused injury to multiple
unrelated patients—by contaminated medications, for example. “To say these
plaintiffs were collectively entitled to $250,000 because there was only one
negligent act would be to render the statute an absurdity.”304 The court, of
course, must seek to avoid statutory interpretations “that lead[ ] to an absurd
result.”305 Applying the cap per plaintiff in Nevada would avoid the type of
302 St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 970 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he most signifi-
cant incentive for defendants to concede liability and submit the issue of damages to arbitra-
tion is the $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. This limitation provides liability insurers
with the ability to improve the predictability of the outcome of claims for the purpose of loss
planning in risk assessment for premium purposes. This predictability can be obtained by
interpreting [Florida’s cap statute] so that each claimant is fairly and reasonably compen-
sated for his or her pain and suffering. Such an interpretation would provide increased pre-
dictability in the outcome of the claims as the insurers would no longer be contending with
the possibility of exorbitant noneconomic damage awards but would have a fixed dollar
amount ($250,000), which each claimant’s award could not exceed. Moreover, this interpre-
tation does more to promote early resolution of medical negligence claims, as it provides an
equitable result which will in turn further encourage claimants to seek resolution through
arbitration.”).
303 Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231, 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Fein v.
Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304 Id. at 239 n.9.
305 See, e.g., Fierle v. Perez, 219 P.3d 906, 911 (Nev. 2009) (internal citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying the rules of statutory construction to NRS
§§ 41A.015, 41A.017, which were enacted by the same initiative petition and ballot question
as NRS § 41A.035, and concluding that “NRS Chapters 41A and 89 must be read in
harmony”).
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absurd result the Atkins court warned about and would also accomplish the goal
of the statute to have no exceptions to the cap. It is reasonable to infer that
voters understood the new statute to be more restrictive than its predecessor
because the new statute eliminated the exceptions and limited noneconomic
damages to a fixed, pre-determined amount for each plaintiff. It also is reasona-
ble to infer that the purpose of the new med mal cap statute was to apply the
cap to each plaintiff and not allow any one plaintiff to collect more than
$350,000 for noneconomic damages. In fact, a good argument can be made that
voters believed they were voting on $350,000 as the adequate compensation
limit for noneconomic damages for each plaintiff.306
That latter argument points to a fundamental problem with the per-incident
advocates’ policy argument, and it is what ultimately may be the fatal flaw for
all of the arguments for per-incident application of the cap. To make their pol-
icy argument, the per-incident advocates again rely on minutes of legislative
committees, legislative hearings, testimony of lobbyists,307 newspaper articles
and other media reports, all of which are outside the scope of the much more
limited “legislative history” relevant here. As discussed in Part V.A., the only
“legislative history” that should be considered is the information the state gave
the voters to consider when voting on the ballot question.
CONCLUSION
A per-plaintiff application of Nevada’s med mal cap is the correct applica-
tion in wrongful deaths for several reasons.
If, as advocates on both sides of the question contend, the statute is not
ambiguous, then the med mal cap statute’s use of singular nouns points to a
plain language per-plaintiff application. The wrongful death statute and Nevada
caselaw interpreting its language lead to the conclusion that each plaintiff heir
in a wrongful death case has his own action with his own recoverable damages.
The Nevada Supreme Court has made “an action” a term of art meaning “cause
of action” in the contexts of damages caps and wrongful death. A per-plaintiff
application of the cap harmonizes the two statutes.
In the alternative, if the statute is ambiguous, as this Note finds it is, then
the court must look to the legislative intent to interpret its meaning.308 Here,
because the statute was the result of a voter initiative, the only “legislative
intent” that should be considered is the intent of the voters. Because Nevada
charges its Secretary of State with providing voters with the official, impartial
explanation of the meaning of a ballot initiative, the most practical and reasona-
ble way to try to ascertain voter intent is to examine the official ballot material.
The ballot material did not tell voters that the new statute would apply per
incident. Rather, the ballot materials said the cap would apply per plaintiff.
Moreover, apparently neither the Nevada Supreme Court nor the Secretary
of State understood the new statute to be changing the cap’s application from
per plaintiff to per incident. In Jones v. Heller, the Nevada Supreme Court
examined the initial ballot information the Secretary of State prepared for vot-
306 But see supra Part V.B.
307 Valley Health System Answering Brief, supra note 88, at 1–2, 9.
308 Miller v. Burk, 188 P.3d 1112, 1119–20 (Nev. 2008).
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ers to determine whether it met the requirement of advising voters of all the
material changes the ballot measure would make to the law,309 and none of the
justices stated that the new statute changed the applicability of the cap from per
plaintiff to per event.310 The court ordered the Secretary of State to revise the
ballot information to accurately reflect the initiative’s proposed changes to
Nevada law, and he did not include in the revised version that the new statute
would change the application of the cap from per plaintiff to per incident.
Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion is that the voter intent (i.e., the
legislative intent) was to enact the changes that the state had outlined in the
ballot information. Because that ballot information did not tell voters that the
changes would include a switch from per-plaintiff application to per-event
application and because the ballot information used the singular to describe the
cap as applicable to “a plaintiff,”311 voters cannot be held to have intended to
enact per-event application. If voters did not intend to make that change, then
the current cap remains, like its predecessor, applicable on a per-plaintiff basis.
Finally, per-plaintiff application is the only way to harmonize the med mal cap
statute with the wrongful death statute, this is not an instance in which Nevada
must follow California’s example, and the per-plaintiff application fulfills the
policy behind the statute.
309 Jones Order, supra note 208, at 1.
310 See generally id.
311 See generally HELLER, supra note 211, at 14–22.
